Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition Cases After Soering by Shea, Michael P
Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of
Human Rights in Extradition Cases
After Soering
Michael P. Sheat
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................ 86
H. TRADrrIONAL EXTRADmON LAW .................................... 87
A. The Judicial Role in the Extradition Process ............................ 88
B. The Rule of Non-Inquiry ........................................ 93
1. The Rule .............................................. 93
2. Potential Exceptions to the Rule ................................ 94
C. Deference to the Head of State .................................... 95
III. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS .............................. 98
A. The European Convention on Human Rights ............................ 98
B. The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights .................. 99
IV. THE SOERING CASE: THE COLuSION OF TWO TRADITIONS ..................... 103
A. The Facts of Soering .......................................... 104
B. The Soering Principles ......................................... 106
1. Requested State Responsibility .................................. 106
2. Standards of Prooffor Potential Violations ......................... 108
3. Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ..................... 109
V. RESPONSES TO THE SOEPJNG DECISION ................................. Ill
A. The United Kingdom: Bowing Reluctantly to the European Court .............. 111
1. Impact on Executive Extradition Practices ......................... 112
2. Soering in the Courts ...................................... 113
B. Canada: A Narrow Reading in a Divided Court ......................... 114
1. The Plurality's Narrow Reading of Soering ......................... 116
2. The Dissents' Broader Interpretation of Soering ...................... 118
C. The United States: Reexamining the Judicial Role ........................ 119
1. Abmad v. Wigen .......................................... 120
2. Ahmad in the Second Circuit ................................. 123
3. Gill v. Imundi: Explaining Ahmad ............................... 124
t J.D. expected, Yale Law School, 1993. I would like to thank Carol Lee, visiting lecturer at Yale
Law School, Spring 1991, for guidance and comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Kirk
Cozine, Eric Angel, and Dan Ehrenberg of the Yale Journal of International Law for their invaluable
suggestions and assistance. This article is dedicated to Fr6ddrique Shea.
Yale Journal of International Law
VI. EXTRADMION REFoRM: A PRoPosAL ................................... 125
A. Extradition on Assurances: A Proposal for Human Rights and Extradition ......... 126
B. Defending the Proposal ......................................... 128
1. Legal Bases ............................................ 128
2. Normative Bases ......................................... 131
3. The Political Question Doctrine ................................. 132
4. The Safe-Haven Problem ..................................... 136
5. Assurances and Judicial Activism ................................ 136
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................ 137
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Soering Case,' the European Court of Human Rights (European
Court) held that Great Britain would violate the European Convention on
Human Rights (European Convention)2 if it extradited Jens Soering to the
United States to face murder charges and a potential death sentence. The
decision captured world attention because the case had tabloid appeal-U.S.
prosecutors believed Soering had collaborated with Elizabeth Haysom, his
girlfriend and the heiress to the Astor steel fortune, to murder her parents-and
because the decision condemned as inhuman and degrading the conditions on
death row in U.S. prisons?
Opponents of capital punishment hailed the decision as evidence that the
death penalty was no longer a legitimate means of punishment under evolving
international norms of justice. More generally, human rights activists asserted
that Soering signaled a new era in international jurisprudence in which treaties,
notably extradition treaties, would be construed to vest rights in individuals,
not simply in states.4 Critics countered that the decision infringed on bilateral
extradition treaties and would make Europe a safe haven for fugitive felons. 5
Soering has sparked a reexamination of the traditional judicial role in
extradition in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. In these
countries Soering fuels the arguments of lawyers and judges who, no longer
trusting assurances of the government, seek to conduct their own inquiries into
judicial processes and penal treatment in states requesting extradition. This
nascent trend could alter significantly the judicial role in international
1. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989).
2. Convention for the Protection of]Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, openedfor signature
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
3. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39-45.
4. See Stephan Breitenmoser & Gunter E. Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: The Socring Case,
11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 845, 879-83 (1990).
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extradition, in which the judge is currently little more than a functionary and
the diplomat is both lawmaker and fact finder. Soering and its small but
growing progeny also highlight the singular status and influence of the Euro-
pean Court, which is quickly becoming one of the world's foremost sources
of human rights law.
This article examines Soering and subsequent cases against the background
of traditional extradition law. Part H surveys the traditional legal approach to
extradition, setting forth principles and justifications. Part III reviews the
activist approach of the European Court. Part IV discusses the collision
between the traditional approach and the activist approach, precipitated by the
Soering decision. Part V looks at the initial consequences of Soering for
traditional extradition law and practice in the United Kingdom, Canada, and
the United States. Part VI argues that much of the rationale supporting the
traditional limited judicial role in extradition law has faded as information on
foreign legal systems has become more accessible, and as international human
rights norms have solidified and gained increasing acceptance by both courts
and national governments. Part VI then outlines a proposal for a new
extradition jurisprudence based on Soering and its progeny.
II. TRADITIONAL EXTRADITION LAW
Traditionally, extradition law is based on treaties. Two states typically
agree in a bilateral treaty to surrender to each other fugitives charged with any
offenses considered extraditable under the agreement. A state seeking
extradition of a fugitive (the requesting state) addresses its requests to the
government of the state where the fugitive is present (the requested state), and
the government invariably acts upon these requests. Domestic extradition
statutes occasionally supplement substantive treaty law, but in general they
merely specify extradition procedures. 6
Courts played no formal role in the extradition process until the middle of
the nineteenth century.7 Extradition was seen strictly as a foreign policy matter
and thus best left to the head of state and his ministers. Monarchs regarded
the fugitive as part of the currency of diplomacy, in the same way as their
modern counterparts now look upon foreign aid, military supplies or a barrel
of oil. The surrender of a fugitive often raised sensitive political concerns that
6. This pattern holds true especially in common law countries. In the United States, for example, the
only extradition statute, the Extradition Act of 1848, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1988), does no more than
specify the procedures by which a foreign state must request a fugitive, and by which officials must arrest
and surrender the fugitive. An alternative formulation occurs when a state promulgates extradition law in
domestic legislation, and then molds extradition treaties to fit its national law. M. CHERiF BAssioUNI,
UNtrrED STATES ExTRADrrON LAW AND PRACTICE 53 (2d rev. ed. 1987).
7. I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADMON IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (1971).
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required the attention of political officials in the government.' The head of
state enjoyed absolute discretion in carrying out extradition agreements and
could surrender fugitives or refuse their surrender without answering to any
domestic authority.
The extradition law that developed from these beginnings assigns a major
role to government officers, leaving a very restricted one for courts. The law
prevents judges from inquiring into judicial and penal conditions in the request-
ing country (the rule of non-inquiry) and creates a pattern of judicial deference
to government decisions at all levels of the process. This traditional allocation
of authority between the government and the courts rested on two premises:
1) extradition is a foreign policy matter; and 2) judges lack adequate
information on foreign legal systems. These premises are now obsolete. 9
A. The Judicial Role in the Extradition Process
Extradition law has gradually evolved from its nineteenth century roots.' 0
Most countries now delegate some extradition responsibilities to judges, 1 but
the ultimate decision to surrender a fugitive remains largely a government
prerogative, as nearly all states circumscribe the judicial role in the extradition
process.' 2 Extradition statutes in the United States 3 require a judge to play
8. See, e.g., In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas. 232 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9,511) (in chambers review
of French extradition request); In reRobbins, 27F. Cas. 825 (C.C.D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) (extradition
of impressed British seaman who escaped during mutiny in which officers were killed); see also infra note
34 (discussing political consequences of these cases).
9. See infra Part VI.
10. See generally SHEARER, supra note 7.
11. Countries retaining a system of exclusive executive control include Spain and Ecuador. See
CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADrrION: THE DELICATE
PROBLEM OF BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER 38
(1980).
12. SHEARER, supra note 7, at 198-200.
13. While Part lI.A focuses on U.S. law, the same principles and rationales apply to extradition law
in the United Kingdom and Canada. Courts in these three countries follow the same general principles of
extradition law. See infra notes 35-61 and accompanying text (discussing role ofjudicial deference to head
of state and rule of non-inquiry in extradition decisions).
This article confines its analysis to these states for three reasons. First, all have similar traditions,
particularly with respect to the role ofjudges in developing law through adjudication. Common law judges
treat extradition requests as cases in which the fugitive appears before the court. Most countries, including
many Continental countries with civil law regimes, limit the judicial role in extradition to an advisory
opinion delivered to the government upon request before it decides to extradite. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT,
supra note 11, at 38. Second, the legal remedies available to fugitives are similar in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Canada. They include habeas corpus petitions to courts and petitions to the
government. Extradition remedies vary widely, however, throughout the rest of the world. Id. at 39-40
(discussing range ofremedies, including no remedy, administrativeremedies,judicial remedies, and hybrids
ofjudicial and administrative remedies). Finally, while the United States and Canada are not parties to the
European Convention, they clearly look to the Convention and its mechanisms for advice on human rights
issues. This article seeks to demonstrate that the jurisprudence of the European Court influences courts
in non-signatory states.
The principle difference among extradition decisions from the three states derives from the constitu-
tional separation-of-powers concerns voiced in opinions by U.S. courts. However, U.K. and Canadian
Vol. 17:85, 1992
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a role that is more administrative than judicial. 4
The judicial officer in an initial extradition proceeding is generally a
magistrate, a fact that indicates the diminished judicial role in the process.15
The magistrate's duty is to certify whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant
the return of the fugitive to the requesting state. The requesting state must
establish four factors: 1) that it has a valid extradition treaty with the requested
state; 6 2) that the person sought is the same person who is before the court;
3) that the acts charged in the complaint constitute a crime in both the
requesting state and the requested state; 7 and 4) that there is probable cause
to believe that the accused committed the acts charged.'"
If the magistrate refuses to certify a request for extradition, the requesting
state has no recourse to a higher authority, but it may renew its request before
another magistrate. 9 This remedy usually suffices since most refusals rest
on technical grounds, such as failure to file all required papers. The new
request simply corrects the technical deficiency.2" On the other hand, if the
magistrate certifies the extradition, the fugitive cannot appeal, as the decision
courts voice analogous concerns. See, e.g., R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
ex parte Council of Civil Service Unions & Another, 1984 I.R.L.R. 309 (Q.B.) (U.K.), available in
LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File, at *50 ("Any decisions as to what constitutes a matter of national
security ... are solely for her Majesty's Government. These are not matters for judges] to examine, much
less determine."); The Zamora, [1916] 2 App. Cas. 77, 107 (U.K.) ("Those who are responsible for the
national security must be the sole judges of what the national security requires. It would be obviously
undesirable that such matters should be made the subject of evidence in a court of law. . . ."); Operation
Dismantle v. The Queen, 18 D.L.R.4th 481, 500 (1985) (Can.) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (issue presented
by challenge to testing of air-launched cruise missiles in Canada was "not the ability of judicial tribunals
to make a decision on the questions presented, but the appropriateness of the use of judicial techniques
for such purposes").
14. See Extradition Act of 1848, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1988).
15. Magistrates in the United States are appointed by thejudges of each federal district court and serve
a variety of delegated judicial functions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631, 636 (1988). The Extradition Act permits
federal judges, state judges, or magistrates acting under the authority of federal judges to issue a warrant
for arrest of the fugitive, hold a hearing, and certify extradition. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988). In practice,
however, magistrates perform most certifications. See Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp. 904, 911 n.3
(1990) (U.S. attorney generally seeks extradition warrant from federal magistrate).
16. International law imposes no duty to extradite in the absence of an extradition treaty. SHEARER,
supra note 7, at 23-27.
17. This requirement is known as the double-criminality rule. See infra note 254 and accompanying
text.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988); see Steven Lubet, Extradition Reform: ExecutiveDiscretion and Judicial
Participation in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 15 CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 247, 257-58 (1982).
19. See, e.g., Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1365-66 (9th Cir.) (allowing requesting state to renew
application for extradition on same charges as application earlier denied), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932
(1978); In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (declaring result of first extradition
proceeding not binding on renewed proceedings); Exparte Schorer, 195 F. 334, 337-38 (E.D. Wis. 1912)
(deeming second arrest and extradition proceeding permissible even when first attempt did not succeed).
20. It is more difficult to gain an extradition certification by filing a second request when the initial
magistrate's denial rests on the political offense exception. For a critique of the non-appealability of political
offense-based denials, see Lubet, supra note 18, at 259-62.
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is not a "final order."2 A fugitive can therefore challenge the certification
of extradition only by filing a writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus review
in this context is limited. A court may determine only whether the magistrate
had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged was within the scope of the
extradition treaty, and whether any evidence supported the finding of probable
cause.' Recent decisions, however, have added constitutional considerations
to this limited inquiry. These precedents permit a court to inquire whether the
United States has facilitated extradition on the basis of the fugitive's race,
color, sex, national origin, religion, or political beliefs, and whether in
presenting the request it infringed the fugitive's due process rights.' These
considerations do not greatly broaden the scope of habeas corpus review,
however, because a fugitive may not challenge any actual or potential
unconstitutional actions on the part of officials of the requesting state. A habeas
corpus petitioner may present constitutional challenges only to the actions of
officials in the requested state, and these officials generally do little more than
arrest the fugitive and help the requesting state present the proper papers.
As with many countries, extradition treaties of the United States contain
provisions barring extradition when the requested state considers the offense
charged by the requesting state to be a "political" one.24 Most of the instances
in which extradition magistrates have gone beyond a limited, ministerial
inquiry have involved political offense cases. If the magistrate determines that
21. In Jhirad v. Ferrandina the Second Circuit explained this principle:
Orders of extradition are sui generis. They embody no judgement on the guilt or innocence of
the accused but serve only to insure that his culpability will be determined in another and, in this
instance, a foreign forum .... Extradition orders do not, therefore, constitute "final decisions
of a district court," appealable as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 [(1988)].
536 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976). British and Canadian courts have ruled
similarly. See, e.g., R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, [1991] 2 App. Cas. 64 (U.K.) (section 11 of
British Extradition Act of 1870 provides for habeas corpus review, rather than direct appellate review, of
magistrate's decision to certify extradition); Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 33 (1987) (Can.)
(holding that, under Canadian extradition statute, courts can review extradition cases only upon receipt of
habeas corpus petition); Atkinson v. United States, 1971 App. Cas. 197 (U.K.) (extradition magistrate's
decision on legal matters "subject only to habeas corpus proceedings"); see also 1 V.E. HARTLEY BOOTH,
BnrrIsH ExTRADmON LAW AND PROCEDUtRE 107 (1980) ("The fugitive has a statutory right to apply for
habeas corpus under the 1870 [Extradition] Act and although this is not strictly an appeal from the
Magistrate's Order ... [the court] does reconsider matters of law.").
22. Jhirad, 536 F.2d at 482. The same is true in the United Kingdom and Canada. However, since
in these nations the government makes a final decision to surrender the fugitive immediately following
certification, the fugitive's habeas petition may also raise the question of the reasonableness of the
government's decision to extradite. In the United States, because the Secretary of State's decision on
whether to extradite comes at the end of the process and is not subject to judicial review, this ground is
unavailable to a fugitive seeking relief through a habeas corpus petition. See infra notes 51-55 and
accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., In re Extradition of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984); for a similar case in Canada,
see Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 38; see also infra note 42.
24. Professor Lubet notes: "The United States, though lacking a constitutional or statutory provision,
has included the political offense exception in each of its 96 treaties of extradition." Lubet, supra note 18
at 250 & n.17 (listing all nations with which United States has bilateral extradition treaties).
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the offense charged is political-and here he has substantial discretion25-then
he may refuse to certify extradition. For example, U.S. courts have
applied-some might say extended-the political offense exception in the
extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom (U.S.-
U.K. Extradition Treaty)' to block the surrender of Irish Republican Army
(I.R.A.) members accused of murdering British policemen and soldiers.27
Legislative responses to the political offense exception illustrate the two
opposing models of extradition law: "executive" and "judicial." Proponents
of an executive model criticize the rule entrusting the political offense
determination to the judiciary and argue that because the determination is
political, like most aspects of extradition, elected officials should make the
decision.2" They also doubt the institutional competence of courts to ascertain
conditions in the requesting country.' Under the executive model, therefore,
courts are to act purely as administrators, certifying that probable cause exists
and that the crime charged is listed in the extradition treaty. In the wake of
the I.R.A. cases, the executive model gained strong support, and some
members of Congress attempted to transform the U.S. extradition statute from
one that merely specifies the procedures to be followed in requesting and
carrying out an extradition into a law granting the Secretary of State exclusive
control over the political offense determination."
Proponents of the judicial model, on the other hand, argue that a judge's
essential duty to protect individual rights requires her to exercise an active role
in all extradition decisions.3 Under this view courts should both inquire into
25. Judicial discretion, as delegated to magistrates, arises from the fact that extradition treaties fail
to define political offense, a term subject to a variety of interpretations. See John Patrick Groarke,
RevolutionariesBeware: The Erosion of the Political Offense Exception Underthe 1986 United States-United
Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1515, 1518-19 (1988) ("There is no
current universally accepted definition of a 'political offense.' Consequently, states have different views
as to the scope of the exception.").
26. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Extradition
Treaty].
27. See, e.g., In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899 Mag.
(N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979), reprinted in Extradition Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1639 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 294 (1981) and in 132 CONG. REc. S9146 (daily ed. July
16, 1986); see also Lubet, supra note 18, at 24 n.35.
28. See, e.g., Lubet, supra note 18, at 280. Professor Lubet argues that elected officials should make
all sensitive, discretionary decisions in extradition, including evaluation of the requesting state's legal
procedures and penal practices and determination of whether the charged act is political. See Extradition
Reform Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 5227 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1981) (testimony of Prof. Steven Lubet).
29. See Tracey Hughes, Comment, Extradition Reform: The Role of the Judiciary in Protecting the
Rights ofa Requested Individual, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 293, 315 (1986).
30. Bills advocating an executive model of extradition review were introduced in the early 1980s.
These bills would have allocated the political offense determination to the Secretary of State. See, e.g.,
S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in S. REP. No. 241, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see
also Hughes, supra note 29, at 313 nn.211-12.
31. See, e.g., Extradition Act of 1984, H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). This bill would have
expanded the judicial role in extradition by, inter alia, allowing judges to determine whether an extradition
91
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the conditions in the requesting country and decide whether a request for an
offender is actually politically motivated. 2 Courts should refuse to extradite
unless completely satisfied by these inquiries. Underlying the judicial model,
therefore, is the notion that the fugitive's human rights are the preeminent
consideration in an extradition case, and that the courts, as impartial arbiters,
are best equipped to protect these rights.33
The U.S. judiciary continues to exercise some discretionary authority over
political offense determinations, since all legislative initiatives to reconfigure
extradition law along either the executive or judicial models have failed.34
The political offense exception in U.S. extradition law remains narrowly
tailored and explicitly provided for by treaty, as it extends judicial discretion
over only a small, discrete class of extradition cases. The application of the
political offense exception has not altered the tradition of restricted judicial
involvement and executive primacy in extradition law.
request for a nonpolitical offense was nonetheless politically motivated. See also H.R. 2643, 98th Cong.,
lst Sess. (1983) (same); H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (same); Extradition Act of 1981:
Hearings on S. 1639 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 112 (1981) (statement of
Prof. Christopher H. Pyle).
32. For example, the House of Representatives' most recent attempt, the Extradition Act of 1984,
H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), if enacted, would have imposed an affirmative duty on courts
to inquire into both existing conditions and political motivations. See also H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5-6 (1984).
33. See Hughes, supra note 29, at 318 (concluding that courts are best first decisionmakers in this
area, although Secretary of State also important).
Various proposals for sharing power in extradition between the government and the judiciary lie
between these two models. Some commentators argue that courts should be allowed to suspend the rule
of non-inquiry and refuse to extradite only in egregious cases, while deferring in all other cases to
government assertions about the fairness of procedures and treatment in the requesting nation. See, e.g.,
id. at 320-22; Leslie Anderson, Protecting the Rights of the Requested Person in Extradition Proceedings:
An Argument for a Humanitarian Exception, in 1983 MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEOAL
STUDIES: TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 153, 164 (John M. Lummis et al. eds.,
1983). Hughes and Anderson believe that political considerations and the failure to provide for judicial
review would prevent proposals for reform based on the executive model from adequately protecting human
rights. They also argue that the judicial model sanctions an inquiry into the requesting state's legal system
and motives not contemplated by the extradition treaty, and imposes the laws of the requested state on the
requesting state. See Anderson, supra, at 163-64; Hughes, supra note 29, at 320-21.
34. See 1982 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC411-12 (providing history oflegislativeefforts to amend Extradition
Act following I.R.A. cases).
However, the next controversial political offense ruling by a federal judge could rekindle congressional
interest in reform. Both major efforts to rewrite the U.S. extradition statute stemmed from public outcry
over controversial judicial rulings in political extradition cases. Congress originally adopted the Extradition
Act in response to In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas. 232 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9,511) (in chambers review
of French extradition request) and In re Robbins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (C.C.D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175)
(extradition of impressed British seaman who escaped during mutiny in which officers were killed).
Likewise, recent attempts at reform were prompted by dissatisfaction with judicial decisions in the I.R.A.
cases. BASSiOUmI, supra note 6, at 48-50.
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B. The Rule of Non-Inquiry
1. The Rule
Extradition law traditionally has blocked judicial inquiry into the fairness
of judicial procedures and penal conditions in the requesting country at any
stage of extradition proceedings. Neither a magistrate certifying an extradition
nor a court hearing a habeas corpus petition was permitted to consider evidence
of human rights abuses in the requesting country.35
This rule of non-inquiry has been justified on four general grounds. First,
judicial inquiry into conditions overseas would involve courts in foreign affairs,
considered the prerogative of the head of state. In the United States, this
argument finds expression in the language of the political question doctrine,
which since Marbury v. Madison36 has barred Article I courts from
considering issues that the U.S. Constitution assigns to the political branches.
Second, courts are ill-equipped to discover the truth about conditions overseas
and lack the investigative machinery to verify claims of human rights abuses
in other states.37 Third, judges are reluctant to pass judgment on their foreign
counterparts, arguing that probing the legal system of another state infringes
on that state's sovereignty.3" Finally, permitting judicial scrutiny of legal
systems in states with different ideologies hinders extradition proceedings and
allows notorious criminals to escape punishment.39
35. See, e.g., Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp. 904 (D. Mass. 1990) (U.S. extradition of Greek
national despite claims of political persecution); Atkinson v. United States, 1971 App. Cas. 197 (U.K.)
(British extradition of U.S. citizen despite claims of oppressive treatment in United States); Schmidt v. The
Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 35 (1987) (Can.) (Canadian extradition of U.S. national despite claim of double
jeopardy); see also Anderson, supra note 33, at 153.
16. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court."); see also Baker v.
Carn, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing criteria for discerning non-justiciable political questions).
37. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984) (accompanying H.R. 2643, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1984)) (bill allocating inquiry into conditions awaiting fugitive in requesting state to
Department of State on theory that only executive has expertise to make such judgments); Republic of
Argentina v. Mellino, 40 D.L.R.4th 74, 91 (1987) (Can.) (noting limitations on information available to
extradition judges).
38. The Canadian Supreme Court has stated this rationale clearly:
It would cripple the operation of our extradition arrangements if extradition judges were to
arrogate the power to consider defences that should properly be raised at trial [in the requesting
state]. How would we react to foreign courts exercising this kind of pre-emptive jurisdiction in
relation to trials in this country?
Mellino, 40 D.L.R.4th at 91. See also Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir.) ("It is not
the business of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system
of another sovereign nation."), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 833 (1976).
39. This argument is usually advanced by commentators who view extradition as a weapon against
international crime, e.g., terrorism. See, e.g., Kent Wellington, Extradition:A Fair and Effective Weapon
in the War on Terrorism, 51 OmHO ST. L.J. 1447, 1450 (1990).
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2. Potential Exceptions to the Rule
A few judicial decisions leave open the possibility that a court might
suspend the rule of non-inquiry in egregious circumstances, without providing
a clear exception to the rule. The first such ruling in the United States was
Gallina v. Fraser."° In Gallina, a habeas corpus petitioner challenged his
extradition to Italy on the grounds that an Italian court had convicted him in
absentia, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to confront his accusers or
conduct a defense. The court upheld the magistrate's extradition certification,
citing the rule of non-inquiry and stating that: "[W]e have discovered no case
authorizing a federal court, in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging
extradition from the United States to a foreign nation, to inquire into the
procedures which await the relator upon extradition." 4 Apparently, so cate-
gorical a rule made the court uneasy, as it admitted that: "Nevertheless, we
confess to some disquiet at this result. We can imagine situations where the
relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment so
antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require reexamination
of the principle set out above."4
The Gallina court did not specify the egregious circumstances necessary
for a judge to block an extradition. Subsequent decisions have done little to
shed light on the limits of a "federal court's sense of decency," and no court
has invoked the phrase to bar an extradition.43 Indeed, most courts since
Gallina have strictly adhered to the old rule of strict non-inquiry." The few
decisions citing the "federal court's sense of decency" treat it as the outer limit
40. 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
41. Id. at 78.
42. Id. at 79. The Canadian Supreme Court has drawn a similarly vague outer limit on the rule of
non-inquiry:
In some circumstances the manner in which the foreign State will deal with the fugitive on
surrender... may be such that it would violate the principles of fundamental justice to surrender
an accused... [such as when] the nature of the criminal procedures or penalties in a foreign
country sufficiently shocks the conscience .... .
Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 39-40 (1987) (Can.). As in Gallina, this language was not
essential to the court's holding, which sanctioned the extradition of a habeas petitioner despite potential
double jeopardy problems. Moreover, as in the United States the reference to "fundamental justice' lacks
supporting precedent, as the Canadian Supreme Court has yet to block an extradition on those grounds.
See United States v. Allard, 40 D.L.R.4th 102 (1987) (Can.) (petitioner must establish that he faces "simply
unacceptable situation"); Mellino, 40 D.L.R.4th 74 (courts may intervene only if surrender of fugitive
would violate principles of fundamental justice).
43. Ambjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[The Gallina]
exception has yet to be employed in an extradition case."); see also Anderson, supra note 33, at 156;
Hughes, supra note 29, at 306 (no court has found circumstances in extradition case to warrant use of
Gallina); John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 1441, 1480 (1988)
(Gallina test is often acknowledged but never invoked).
44. E.g., Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp. 904, 916 (D. Mass. 1990).
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of the rule of non-inquiry, but do not give it content.4'
C. Deference to the Head of State
Restricted judicial review of extradition decisions by the head of state is
a corollary to the rule of judicial non-inquiry. Diplomats, rather than judges,
do most of the adjudicating in extradition matters. The Secretary of State or
Foreign Minister enjoys broad discretion to interpret the relevant law (treaties),
consider the equities (human rights concerns), and balance competing
considerations (the need for international criminal law enforcement and the
diplomatic interest in honoring international agreements). Normally the
province of judges, this weighing and balancing in extradition cases has
devolved onto officials who serve at the pleasure of the head of state. Judges
themselves play a lesser role, serving in most cases as functionaries who rarely
question the judgment of policynakers.
Courts thus generally require that fugitives seeking to challenge extradition
on human rights grounds should appeal to the government, not to the courts.
46
45. In United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit
noted that petitioners' "[i]nability to assert a defense might ... [violate] a federal court's sense of
decency." The court did not decide the issue, but rather permitted extradition despite petitioners' conviction
in absentia because it found no merit in their claim that they had not been able to assert a defense:
Here there is no indication that, despite representation by counsel, [petitioners] had any defense
to make, other than their legal one challenging the indictment. Indeed, it affirmatively appears
that Canadian counsel each expressly waived calling any witnesses and rested solely on the legal
argument, and that the trial court's ruling was made after close of all the evidence.
Id. at 928 (citation omitted).
Habeas corpus petitioners have also invoked the "sense of decency" phrase outside the context of
extradition. In Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980), for example, three U.S. citizens falsely
convicted in Mexico and physically abused in Mexican jails were allowed to complete their sentences in
a U.S. federal prison under an agreement between Mexico and the United States. Once in the United States,
they challenged their continued incarceration, arguing that it rested on convictions obtained under conditions
devoid of due process. The court agreed to consider the merits of the claim because "a petitioner incar-
cerated under federal authority pursuant to a foreign conviction cannot be denied all access to a United
States court when he presents a persuasive showing that his conviction was obtained without the benefit
of any process whatsoever." Id. at 1198. The court cited Gallina as supporting authority: "[T]his court
has theoretically indicated that the presumption of fairness routinely accorded the criminal process of a
foreign sovereign may require closer scrutiny if a relator persuasively demonstrates that extradition would
expose him to procedures or punishment 'antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency.'" Id. at 1195.
Fearing that ruling otherwise would hinder future humanitarian exchanges between the United States and
Mexico, the court ultimately denied the petitions. Id. at 1201.
One commentator argues that these decisions represent an "erosion of the rule of non-inquiry." See
Hughes, supra note 29, at 303-12. This characterizationgoes too far, however, because all these statements
favoring suspension of the rule have been voiced in dicta; no court has actually overturned an extradition
or foreign conviction on these grounds.
46. See, e.g., Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[D]egree of risk to [petitioner's]
life is an issue that properly falls within the exclusive purview of the executive branch.'); Koskotas, 740
F. Supp. at 917 ("[Allthough [petitioner] is free to raise Greece's allegedly illicit motives and the physical
threat to his life with the Secretary of State, the courts are not the proper forum for consideration of those
matters.'). For a similar holding in the United Kingdom, see Atkinson v. United States, 1971 App. Cas.
197 (U.K.) ("'The Act does provide a safeguard. The Secretary of State always has power to refuse to
surrender [a fugitive] ... whenever in his view it would be wrong, unjust or oppressive to surrender the
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This practice rests on the belief that the government, specifically the Foreign
Minister or Secretary of State, has the best information on the judicial and
penal practices of the requesting state.47 Further, since the government
conducts foreign policy, it can best weigh human rights concerns against other
factors, such as the need to honor treaty obligations.
In the United States, courts generally view the Secretary of State's decision
to present the extradition request as a signal of confidence that the fugitive will
receive fair treatment in the requesting state. The State Department generally
does not present extradition requests from governments whose human rights
records are widely condemned.48 United States courts also give great weight
to exectuive branch interpretations of extradition treaties.4 9 Finally, U.S.
courts interpret a provision of the Extradition Act, which states that the
Secretary of State "may order the person [whose extradition has been certified
by a magistrate] . . . to be delivered to an authorized agent [of the requesting
state],"5 to preclude judicial review of the Secretary's final decision."1 The
fugitive must thus exhaust all habeas corpus appeals before the Secretary of
State makes a final decision on whether to extradite.5" A U.S. court's decision
to certify extradition is therefore not final, as the Secretary of State retains
discretion to extradite or to refuse to surrender the fugitive.5"
The process is similar in the United Kingdom, except that the fugitive may
seek judicial review of the Foreign Minister's final decision to extradite. 4
man .... Parliament by providing this safeguard has excluded the jurisdiction of the courts."). For an
example in Canada, see Schmidt, 39 D.L.R.4th at 40 ("judicial intervention should await the exercise of
executive discretion" on claims of ill-treatment in requesting state). See also Wellington, supra note 39,
at 1449 ("[Plotential due process deficiencies ... fall within the exclusive purview of the executive
branch.").
47. See Schmh*, 39 D.L.R.4th at 41.
48. Kester, supra note 43, at 1480. Thus the government's request for extradition on behalf of a
requesting state implies its recognition of that state's ability to grant justice to the fugitive. An exception
to this practice is In re Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370 (C.D. Cal. 1986), in which the executive presented
Yugoslavia's extradition request for the surrender of an accused war criminal, despite allegations of human
rights abuses in that nation. The district court permitted the extradition because it refused to consider his
alleged crimes "political offenses." The Ninth Circuit refused to stay extradition to permit appeal of the
denial of habeas corpus petition. Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986).
49. See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 1985) (State Department's
interpretation of U.S.-Israel extradition treaty "entitled to considerable deference").
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1988).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 499 n.10 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[The Secretary
of State is not bound to extradite even if the certificate is granted."); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d
1098, 1105 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Assuming that the magistrate's decision is in favor of extradition, the
Executive's discretionary determination to extradite the fugitive ... is not generally subject to judicial
review."); see also Anderson, supra note 33, at 160 (noting lack of provision for judicial review of
Secretary of State's extradition decisions).
52. See Lubet, supra note 18, at 260.
53. Refusals of extradition requests are very rare; see infra note 262 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Re Chinoy, CO/792189 (Q.B.) (1990), available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File,
at *3 ("Domestic remedies are, for the moment, exhausted. I say for 'the moment' because the final stage
domestically, if there is to be return to the United States, would be an order by the Secretary of State. It
is indicated to us that such an order is very likely to be challenged by way of judicial review. . .
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British courts employ a standard first articulated in Associated Provincial
Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corp., which permits a court to strike down
executive decisions only when "no reasonable" executive official would have
made them.'5 Canadian courts also review the government's final decision
to extradite,"5 and like their British counterparts Canadian judges generally
defer.5 7
Jens Soering's experience illustrates the British approach. Before seeking
relief from the European Court, Soering pleaded his case in British courts.5 8
He argued that the Foreign Secretary had violated Article IV of the U.S.-U.K.
Extradition Treaty by failing to obtain an ironclad promise from Virginia
prosecutors not to seek the death penalty. Article IV allows therequested state
to refuse to surrender capital felons unless the requesting state gives assurances
that the death penalty will not be carried out.59 Virginia prosecutors agreed
only to inform the sentencing judge of the British government's desire that
Soering not be executed. Soering argued that this "assurance" fell far short of
the requirements the treaty provision imposed on the Foreign Secretary. The
divisional court disagreed.60 It held that Article IV granted the Foreign
Secretary discretion to evaluate the adequacy of any assurances made by the
requesting state. The court stated that although the assurance obtained left
"something to be desired" and was probably not what the-treaty intended, the
decision was not so unreasonable as to violate the Wednesbury standard. 6
Soering's experience demonstrates the extent to which traditional extradition
law has confined the judicial role.
55. [1948] 1 K.B. 223, 234 (U.K.).
56. E.g., Kindler v. Canada, No. 21,321, slip op. at 6 (Sept. 26, 1991) (Can.) (Cory, J., dissenting)
(reviewing Foreign Minister's extradition decision).
57. However, in Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 40 (1987) (Can.), the Canadian Supreme
Court cautioned:
[Although] [b]lind judicial deference to executive judgement cannot ... be expected ...
[extradition] is an area where the Executive is likely to be far better informed than the courts,
and where the courts must be extremely circumspect so as to avoid interfering unduly in decisions
that involve the good faith and honour of this country in its relations with other states.
58. The European Court of Human Rights only accepts petitions from individuals who have exhausted
all domestic remedies. Brian Walsh, Foreword to 1 VINCENT BERGER, CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIrHTs at xiii (1989); see also European Convention, supra note 2, arts. 24-25.
59. Article IV of the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty provides:
If the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the relevant law
of the requesting Party, but the relevant law of the requested Party does not provide for the death
penalty in a similar case, extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party gives assurances
satisfactory to the requested Party that the death penalty will not be carried out.
U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 26, art. IV. Under current U.K. law, only a few military crimes
are punishable by death. The last execution in the United Kingdom occurred in 1964. See Factum of
Intervener Amnesty International at app. 1, Kindler v. Canada, No. 21,321, slip op. (Sept. 26, 1991) (Can.)
(on file with author).
60. Re Soering, 1988 Crim. L. Rep. 307 (Q.B.), available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File.
61. Id. at *12.
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]I. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The deferential approach to extradition adopted by judges on national courts
contrasts sharply with the activist tradition of the European Court of Human
Rights. While the decision invalidating the extradition of Jens Soering because
of "inhumane" conditions on death row was a dramatic, ground-breaking
ruling,62 it was neither without precedent nor particularly surprising in light
of the European Court's record in human rights law.
A. The European Convention on Human Rights
The European Court was established under the European Convention on
Human Rights (European Convention), adopted by the European nations
comprising the Council of Europe in 1950.63 A total of twenty-three states
have now signed the Convention. The European Convention was not the first
international declaration of human rights, but it was the first to provide
institutional machinery for supervision and enforcement of those rights.'
The provisions of the European Convention are interpreted and given force
by both the European Commission on Human Rights (Commission) and the
European Court.65 The Commission screens the European Court's docket by
attempting to settle disputes and, failing that, by determining whether the
European Court has jurisdiction to hear them under the Convention. If it
cannot mediate a settlement, the Commission publishes an opinion that either
explains why the application is inadmissible or limits the issues the European
Court may consider. The European Court may not "reach out" to decide cases
not referred to the Court by the Commission or resolve issues not explicitly
formulated in the Commission's report.66 For the vast majority of individual
applicants, the Commission is the agency of last resort.67
Rulings of the European Court bind the parties only if they submit to its
jurisdiction. This requirement rarely becomes an issue. Almost all the
European Convention's contracting states have consented to the European
Court's jurisdiction,6" and individuals are eager to submit to the Court's
62. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
63. See FRANcIs G. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1975).
64. J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITrERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGrs 1 (1988).
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id. at 4.
67. In 1983, for example, the Commission opened 3,150 provisional files. However, it formally
registered only 499 applications, and it declared 407 of these inadmissible, sending a mere 29 on to the
Court. In 1986, the Commission declared inadmissible 395 applications and sent 45 to the Court. MARK
W. JANIs & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 55 (1990).
68. Moreover, as of January 1, 1990, all contracting states had agreed to recognize the right of
individuals to apply to the Commission for relief. Id. at 42.
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authority, since they are usually the parties seeking relief. As a result, the
issue of personal jurisdiction is not regularly a contentious one.69
B. The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
Bolstered by the broad acceptance of its authority, the European Court
forged a variety of innovations in international human rights law prior to its
decision in Soering. Many of these innovations are remarkable not so much
for the particular rights protected, but for the scope of the protection.
The line of decisions in which the European Court interpreted the European
Convention's protection of privacy and family life provides a good example.
In the Dudgeon Case,7 the European Court ruled that the mere existence of
laws criminalizing certain homosexual acts in Northern Ireland, without actual
proof of injury from these laws, violated Article 8 of the Convention.
Petitioner Dudgeon had never been prosecuted for homosexual activity.
Nonetheless, he contended that the existence of anti-sodomy laws had caused
him psychological distress and thus violated Article 8. The European Court
agreed, and held that anti-sodomy laws violated the European Convention. 2
Although this finding was progressive, it was not innovative, in that most
member states of the Council of Europe no longer banned homosexual activi-
ty.' The noteworthy aspect of the decision was that it held that
"psychological distress" caused by the existence of such laws constituted a
69. Contrast this approach to jurisdiction with that of the International Court of Justice, where
jurisdiction is frequently disputed. See MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 8. The European Court has another
advantage: judges agree more often, id. at 36, and their frequently unanimous decisions resonate with more
force than the International Court's dissent-filled opinions. CLORIS C. MoRRISSON, JR., THE DYNAMIcs
oF DEvLOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN HuMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION SYSTFM 33 (1981).
70. Article 8 of the European Convention provides that:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety, or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
European Convention, supra note 2, art. 8.
71. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
72. The Court stated that:
In the personal circumstances of the applicant, the very existence of this legislation continuously
and directly affects his private life ... : either he respects the law and refrains from engaging-
even in private with consenting male partners-in prohibited sexual acts to which he is disposed
by reason of his homosexual tendencies, or he commits such acts and thereby becomes liable
to criminal prosecution.
Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 23-24.
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sufficient injury on which to grant relief.74 In most jurisdictions this injury
would not warrant judicial intervention.7I
The European Court's restrictions on wiretapping under Article 8 provide
another example. The European Court ruled in Malone and Kass and Others
that it could examine wiretapping procedures even though applicants offered
no specific proof of the extent to which their privacy was invaded.76 The
Court held that since wire-tapping is generally shrouded in secrecy and difficult
to substantiate, requiring an applicant to prove its extent would violate the
spirit of Article 8.' This was so, the Court concluded, because an applicant
may not forfeit a right conferred by the European Convention "by the simple
fact that the person concerned is kept unaware of its violation. ""
The European Court has given other provisions of the European Conven-
tion broad effect. In Piersack, for example, the Court formulated a two-
pronged test to guarantee the right to an impartial tribunal provided in Article
6(1) of the Convention.79 The first prong is unremarkable: a court must
ascertain whether "the personal conviction of a given judge in a given case"
was prejudiced. 0 The second prong, however, requires a court to determine
whether the tribunal appeared fair, that is, whether the tribunal "offered
guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.""t The
74. Id. at 17.
75. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (denying standing to married couple to challenge Georgia's
statute criminalizing sodomy, but granting standing to homosexual who had shown likelihood of prosecution
by presenting evidence of past attempts to indict him under anti-sodomy law); R. v. Secretary of State for
Home Dep't exparte Zia Mehmet Binbasi, 1989 1mm. App. R. 595 (Q.B.), available in LEXIS, Enggen
Library, Cases File (refusal of U.K. immigration court to disturb Foreign Secretary's denial of political
asylum to homosexual who claimed persecution if returned to Northern Cyprus, given that nation's statute
criminalizing homosexual behavior); see infra notes 147-158 and accompanying text.
76. Malone Case, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at paras. 81, 84 (1984); Klass Case, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 21-22 (1978); see also JAm & KAY, supra note 67, at 220 (discussing wiretapping cases).
77. Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19.
78. Id. Compare this position with that of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has held that
wiretaps are unconstitutional. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
(requiring prior judicial approval of wiretaps); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (same).
However, in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), the Court held that a claim that a domestic military
surveillance system violated the First Amendment was non-justiciable, since the plaintiffs failed to show
that the surveillance system spied on them personally. This decision required plaintiffs in wiretapping cases
to offer specific allegations and proof of surveillance, whereas the European Court in Malone and Klass
and Others found that the nature of wiretapping made it unfair to impose such a burden. See JANs & KAY,
supra note 67, at 220 (discussing comparison).
79. 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982). In Piersack the applicant claimed that since the judge who
presided over his murder trial had previously headed the section of the prosecutor's office that initiated
the prosecution, the tribunal was not impartial. Agreeing, the European Court did not question the judge's
personal impartiality, but focused on appearances: "What is at stake is the confidence which the courts must
inspire in the public in a democratic society .... It is sufficient to find that the impartiality of the
'tribunal' which had to determine the merits... of the charge was capable of appearing open to doubt."
Id. paras. 30-31.
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Court ruled similarly in the De Cubber Case,"a in which appellant challenged
a Belgian judicial proceeding in which the presiding judge had previously
served as investigating judge on the case. The Belgian government contended
that since individual judges faced huge workloads, a single judge was bound
to handle different aspects of the same case, and avoiding this result would
require the government to restructure its judicial system at great cost. The
European Court held, however, that the European Convention superseded any
such considerations.8 3 Rather, the appearance of impartiality was crucial, and
an individual who served as investigating judge could not later serve as
presiding judge."
Although these rulings have greatly expanded the protection of human
rights, the European Court's most striking innovations come from its
interpretations of Article 3, which provides that: "No one shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."85 In Ireland
82. 86 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984).
83. The opinion placed special emphasis on states' obligations under the European Convention:
The Court recalls that the Contracting States are under the obligation to organize their legal
systems "so as to insure compliance with the requirements of Article 6, section 1" ... ;
impartiality is unquestionably one of the foremost of those requirements. The Court's task is to
determine whether the Contracting States have achieved the result called for by the Convention,
not to indicate the particular means to be utilized.
Id. para. 35 (citation omitted).
84. The Court concluded that:
One can accordingly understand that an accused might feel some unease should he see on the
bench of the court called upon to determine the charge against him the judge who had ordered
him to be placed in detention on remand and who had interrogated him on numerous occasions
during the preparatory investigation, albeit with questions dictated by the concern to ascertain
the truth.
Id. para. 29.
This preference for human rights over governmental concerns also emerges in the European Court's
interpretation of the guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 6, which provides in part: "Everyone is
entitled to a... hearing within a reasonable time...." European Convention, supra note 2, art. 6. In
the Guincho Case, 81 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984), the European Court ruled that this provision bars
clearly unreasonable systemic delays (e.g., a delay of ten years) caused by a state in determining the
applicant's legal rights. Such a delay is acceptable only when the state can show that it stems from an
emergency, such as a sudden, unanticipated backlog in the judicial system. However, the increase in
litigation after Portugal's return to democracy involved in Guincho was not unforeseen, and thus Portugal's
ineffective efforts to deal with the problem did not excuse it from liability. By contrast, the U.S. Supreme
Court has indicated it might excuse delay due to ordinary judicial backlogs. See Strunck v. United States,
412 U.S. 434, 435 (1973). See generally JAIS & KAY, supra note 67, at 393 (comparing U.S. Supreme
Court and European Court on issue of backlogs).
85. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 3. Article 3 does not provide for exceptions, and under
Article 15, § 2, derogations from Article 3 are not permitted. Id. art. 15, § 2. The European Court has
respected the absolute character of Article 3.
The European Court has also formulated more specific and comprehensive definitions of "torture,"
"degrading treatment," and "degrading punishment" than those available under other international treaties
or court decisions. The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/39146 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987) (ratified by U.S. Senate Oct. 27, 1990), reprinted
in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) [hereinafter U.N. Torture Convention], repinted in 23 U.N. RESOLUTIONS 395
(Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1984-85), includes a lengthy definition of "torture".
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v. United Kingdom,86 for example, the European Court distinguished among
"torture," "inhuman treatment," and "degrading treatment." Authorities in
Northern Ireland, using extrajudicial powers of arrest, detention, and
interrogation, subjected a total of fourteen individuals suspected of I.R.A.-
driven terrorist activities to five unusual interrogation techniques.8 7 The
European Court determined these practices to be "inhuman treatment"8 and
"degrading treatment."8 9 The techniques, however, did not constitute torture.
The Court reasoned that torture required both intense cruelty on the part of
the perpetrator and substantial physical suffering on the part of the victim.
Although some of the fourteen detainees had lost weight and developed severe
psychiatric symptoms, the Court held that none had suffered physical injury
of the magnitude required for a finding of torture.9"
In 7yrer9? ' the European Court considered an Isle of Man statute that
permitted imposition of judicial corporal punishment. The Court ruled that
corporal punishment consisting of three strokes of a birch club constituted
"degrading punishment" under Article 3, even though the applicant did not
suffer severe or enduring physical harm, and despite the substantial safeguards
under which the punishment was administered.' The European Court found
Morture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising from, inherent in, or incidental
to lawful sanctions.
Id. art. 1. The U.N. Torture Convention, however, neither defines "inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" nor offers a guide for judicial application of those terms.
86. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1970).
87. The techniques included: 1) forcing prisoners to remain for long periods in a spread-eagle position
against the wall, 2) covering prisoners' heads with a dark bag, 3) maintaining a loud noise in the room,
4) depriving prisoners of sleep, and 5) reducing prisoners' allotment of food and drink. Id. at 41.
88. The Court first focused on the effects of the treatment on the detainees:
The five techniques were applied in combination, with premeditation and for hours at a stretch;
they caused, if not actual bodily injury, at least intense physical and mental suffering to the
persons subjected thereto and also led to acute psychiatric disturbances during interrogation. They
accordingly fell into the category of inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3.
Id. at 66.
89. The Court determined that "[tihe techniques were also degrading since they were such as to arouse
in their victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and
possibly breaking their physical and moral resistance." Id.
90. The Court reached this conclusion by investigating the intent of the treatment:
Although the five techniques, as applied in combination, undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and
degrading treatment, although their object was the extraction of confessions, the naming of others
and/or information and although they were used systematically, they did not occasion suffering
of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood.
Id. at 67.
91. 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
92. Safeguards included prior medical examination, presence of a doctor, attendance of the schoolboy's
parents, presence of a senior police supervisor, and detailed regulations on the number of strokes and the
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that corporal punishment was a per se assault on a person's dignity and
physical integrity and thereby "degrading. "I The Court further noted that the
negative effects and indignity of corporal punishment were exacerbated by the
delay between sentencing and execution.94 Finally, the Court rejected the
respondent government's contention that corporal punishment was an effective
deterrent. Instead, the Court held that the rights established by Article 3 were
absolute, and therefore the provision must be strictly construed.95
The European Court again visited the issue of corporal punishment in
Campbell,96 in which parents of two Scottish schoolchildren, neither of whom
had ever received corporal punishment, challenged the existence of the laws
permitting its use. The Court ruled that this situation was sufficient for judicial
consideration and concluded that: "provided it is sufficiently real and
immediate, a mere threat of conduct prohibited by Article 3 may itself be in
conflict with that provision. Thus, to threaten an individual with torture might
in some circumstances constitute at least 'inhuman treatment.'" 9 7 The Court
ultimately held that the corporal punishment used by Scottish schoolteachers
did not violate Article 3 since its use was supported by a majority of parents,
and there was no evidence that the actual punishment used was humiliating or
debasing.9"
IV. THE SOERING CASE: THE COLLISION OF TWO TRADITIONS
The European Court in Soering drew upon and extended these earlier
innovations. In Soering the Court held that Great Britain's extradition of Jens
dimensions of the club. Id. at 7-8, 32.
93. This conclusion depended upon the close link between the indignity and the form of punishment:
IThe very nature of judicial corporal punishment is that it involves one human being inflicting
physical violence on another human being .... [The applicant's] punishment-whereby he was
treated as an object in the power of the authorities--constituted an assault on precisely that which
it is one of the main purposes of Article 3 to protect, namely the person's dignity and physical
integrity. Neither can it be excluded that the punishment may have had adverse psychological
effects.
Id. para. 33.
94. The Court wrote:
Admittedly, the relevant legislation provides that ... birching shall not take place later than six
months after the passing of sentence. However, this does not alter the fact that there had been
an interval of several weeks since the applicant's conviction by the juvenile court and a
considerable delay in the police station where the punishment was carried out. Accordingly, in
addition to the physical pain he experienced, Mr. Tyrer was subjected to the mental anguish of
anticipating the violence he was to have inflicted on him.
Id.
95. The Court emphasized that 'it is never permissible to have recourse to punishments which are
contrary to Article 3, whatever their deterrent effect may be." Id. para. 31.
96. 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982).
97. Id. para. 26.
98. Id. paras. 29-31.
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Soering to the United States would violate the European Convention.99 The
decision articulated three considerations that could have profound consequences
for extradition law: 1) the requested state is responsible for treatment of the
fugitive following extradition if that treatment violates the Convention; 2)
potential violations will be reviewed under a "substantial grounds" standard
of proof; and 3) the definition of "inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" under Article 3 of the European Convention now includes the
effects of anticipated punishment.
A. The Facts of Soering
Jens Soering, a West German national born in 1966, spent his teenage
years in the United States and enrolled at the University of Virginia in 1984,
where he fell in love with Elizabeth Haysom, a fellow student.'0° Haysom's
parents strongly opposed the relationship.'' Tension between the two couples
grew, and according to Soering's admission, he and Ms. Haysom eventually
devised a plan to kill her parents."ea On the evening of March 30, 1985,
Soering went to the parents' house in Boonsboro, Virginia to discuss his
relationship with their daughter. When they told him they would try to force
the couple apart, he attacked them with a knife, inflicted massive stab wounds,
and slit their throats.o3
Soering and Haysom fled in October 1985, only to be arrested in Great
Britain in April 1986 for check fraud. In August 1986, the U.S. government
requested their extradition under its treaty with the United Kingdom. t4
Haysom did not challenge extradition, and on May 8, 1987, the United
Kingdom surrendered her. She pleaded guilty as an accessory to the murder
of her parents and agreed to testify against Jens Soering. She was sentenced
on October 6, 1987 to ninety years' imprisonment. 0 5
Soering fought his extradition. He argued before the certifying magistrate
that he suffered fromfolie ek deux, a psychiatric disorder that he claimed had
diminished his responsibility for his acts. This argument did not persuade the
magistrate, who committed Soering to detention to await the Foreign Minister's
extradition order."°6 Soering applied to the divisional court for a writ of
habeas corpus and for leave to apply for judicial review of the government's
99. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36, 39-45 (1989).
100. The background to the Soering decision has been thoroughly discussed elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 128 (1991).
101. Id.
102. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1989).
103. Id.
104. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 26.
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order. He also challenged the sufficiency of the assurances given by the
prosecutors in Virginia."° The divisional court denied the habeas corpus
petition, and refused to find unreasonable the Foreign Minister's decision to
accept the assurances.' On June 30, 1988, the House of Lords rejected
Soering's petition for leave to appeal," and on August 3, the Foreign
Minister ordered Soering's surrender to the United States.
Soering next applied to the European Commission on Human Rights, as
he had exhausted his remedies in the United Kingdom."' He made three
arguments."' First, he contended that his extradition would expose him to
the "death row phenomenon"-the prolonged uncertainty during the lengthy
appeals process combined with the severe conditions of confinement on death
row-which he alleged constituted "inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment," thereby violating Article 3 of the European Convention."
2
Second, he asserted that his extradition would violate the guarantees of a fair
trial contained in Article 6 of the Convention, "' because public legal aid in
Virginia would not fund federal habeas corpus challenges to the death penalty.
Third, he argued that the U.K. extradition system violated Article 13 of the
European Convention" 4 because it failed to provide him with an "effective
remedy before a national authority" for an Article 3 violation.
The Commission declared Soering's application admissible on November
10, 1988, and issued its report on January 19, 1989."' The Commission
rejected Soering's Article 3 claim by a vote of six to five. In the majority's
view, the death row phenomenon did not constitute inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment." 6 The Commission also unanimously rejected the
Article 6 claim, reasoning that the British government could not be held
directly responsible for the lack of funds for legal aid in Virginia.
117
107. Soering argued that the British Government violated Article IV of the U.S.-U.K. Extradition
Treaty by failing to obtain an absolute assurance from Virginia prosecutors that they would not seek the
death penalty. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
108. Re Soering, 1988 Crim. L. Rep. 307 (Q.B.), available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File.
109. Lillich, supra note 100, at 130.
110. Article 26 of European Convention provides "[The] Commission may only deal with a matter
after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international
law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken." European
Convention, supra note 2, art. 26.
111. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30-31 (1989).
112. Article 3 states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." European Convention, supra note 2, art. 3.
113. See supra note 84 (quoting text of Article 6).
114. Article 13 of the Convention provides: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity." European Convention, supra note
2, art. 13.
115. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31.
116. Soering Commission Report, reprintedin id. at 67-68; see infra notes 136-137 and accompanying
text.
117. Soering Commission Report, supra note 116, at 68.
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However, it upheld Soering's Article 13 claim by a vote of seven to four, on
the grounds that the U.K. extradition system had not provided Soering with
an effective remedy for his Article 3 claim because it unduly restricted the
ability of judges to review a fugitive's allegations of mistreatment."' The
Commission referred the case to the European Court on January 25, 1989.
B. The Soering Principles
The European Court held oral arguments in the Soering case on April 24,
1989, and delivered its judgment on July 7, 1989. It ruled that if the United
Kingdom extradited Soering to the United States without assurances against
imposition of the death penalty, it would violate the European Convention.
Three principles underlay this result: 1) requested state responsibility; 2)
standards of proof for potential violations; and 3) inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
1. Requested State Responsibility
The European Court first declared that requested states in extradition cases
could incur liability for European Convention violations taking place after
extradition to the requesting state. Thus if the United Kingdom extradited
Soering, it would be held to have "subjected" him to any treatment he received
in the United States that violated Article 3.119
Article 3 does not discuss extradition. In fact, the European Convention
mentions extradition only once, and then in a limited context. 120 Nonetheless,
the Commission, in a handful of decisions prior to Soering, had recognized
that extradition or deportation may violate Article 3 when the fugitive faces
an objective danger that the requesting state will violate his or her human
rights.' Soering presented the European Court with its first chance to rule
118. Id. at 70-71.
119. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-36.
120. Article 5, § 1 provides in part: 'No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following
cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ... (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person ... against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition." European
Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, § 1.
121. See, e.g., Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10479/83, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 158 (1984) (applicant failed to show that rights guaranteed by Article 3 would be grossly violated
in requesting nation); Altun v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 10308/83, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 209 (1983) (individual's extradition may violate Article 3 in exceptional circumstances where
there are serious reasons to believe he will be subjected to proscribed treatment); X v. Federal Republic
of Germany, App. No. 1802/62, 1963 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 462, 480 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.)
(extradition to state that violated human rights might implicate Article 3, but applicant's extradition did
not); S v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 1465/62, 9 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 63 (1962)
(applicant's deportation did not raise Article 3 issue).
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on this principle of objective danger,1" and the Court took the opportunity
to go further than the Commission. In most Commission decisions both the
requested state and the requesting state were parties to the European
Convention. The Commission had previously recognized the responsibility of
the requested state when the requesting state was not a party to the European
Convention, 1" but the Commission had found no substantive Article 3
violations in these cases, so that its recognition of requested state responsibility
had no effect.
The Soering decision, in contrast, held the requested state responsible under
Article 3 and directly affected a requesting state not party to the European
Convention. The Soering Court began by highlighting the need to make Euro-
pean Convention safeguards "practical and effective.""124 The Court stressed
that the Article 3 prohibition against inhuman treatment was absolute,
warranting its application to extradition requests received by European
Convention signatories from nonparty states: the spirit of Article 3 barred
extradition of fugitives to states where they probably would face inhuman
treatment."z The Court denied that this holding gave extraterritorial effect to
the European Convention; rather, it simply established the Convention
obligations of the requested state. The Court stated it did not intend to extend
its jurisdiction by dictating behavior to the requesting state:
Article 1 cannot be read as justifying a general principle to the effect that,
notwithstanding its extradition obligations, a Contracting State may not surrender
an individual unless satisfied that the conditions awaiting him in the country of
destination are in full accord with each of the safeguards of the Convention ....
These considerations cannot, however, absolve the Contracting Parties from
responsibility under Article 3 for all and any foreseeable consequences of extradition
suffered outside their jurisdiction."2
122. Lillich, supra note 100, at 138.
123. See, e.g., Kirkwood, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 158 (recognizing that British
extradition of fugitive to United States might violate Article 3 if treatment in United States were sufficiently
severe). For further discussion of Kirkwood, see infra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
124. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1989).
125. The European Court drew upon the U.N. Torture Convention, supra note 85, to aid its
interpretation of Article 3:
That the abhorrence of torture has such implications is recognised in Article 3 of the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, which provides that 'no State Party shall ... extradite a person where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.' The
fact that a specialised treaty should spell out in detail a specific obligation attaching to the
prohibition of torture does not mean that an essentially similar obligation is not already inherent
in the general terms of Article 3 of the European Convention.
Id. at 34-35.
126. Id. at 33-34.
Yale Journal of International Law
2. Standards of Prooffor Potential Violations
A fugitive protesting his extradition who claims the requesting state violates
the European Convention can allege only potential (not yet realized), rather
than actual, violations. The European Court, in Campbell,27 held that threats
of prohibited conduct may themselves violate Article 3, but specified no
standard of proof for evaluating threatened or potential violations (beyond
noting that the threat must be "sufficiently real and immediate").,2 The
second extradition-related aspect of Soering, an innovation in Article 3
jurisprudence, was to articulate a standard of proof for potential violations.
The Court in Soering ruled that an extradition violated Article 3 "where
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the [fugitive], if
extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment in the requesting country. "129 The European Court found
that Soering faced such a danger because the Virginia prosecutors intended to
seek the death penalty.13 The Court held that the "assurances" offered by
the prosecutors were inadequate, as they promised merely to inform the
sentencing judge that the United Kingdom opposed imposition of the death
penalty. These promises alone, the Court concluded, did not reduce the risk
of an Article 3 violation: "[O]bjectively it cannot be said that the undertaking
to inform the judge at the sentencing stage of the wishes of the United
Kingdom eliminates the risk of the death penalty being imposed."' This
result created a new standard of proof for potential violations in extradition
cases, requiring a requested state to demonstrate that violations of the
Convention by a requesting state are highly unlikely.'
127. 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982).
128. Id. para. 26.
129. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35. This standard of proof was similar to the showing
of "an objective danger" to the person to be extradited required by the Commission in Altun v. Federal
Republic of Germany, App. No. 10308/83, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 209, 232 (1983), and again
in Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10479/83, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158, 183
(1984). See infra notes 135-138 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's decision in Kirkwood).
130. The Court inferred that this conclusion was inescapable:
If the... authority with responsibility for prosecuting the offence takes such a firm stance, it
is hardly open to the Court to hold that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the
applicant faces a real risk of being sentenced to death and hence experiencing the "death row
phenomenon."
Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39.
131. Id. at 38.
132. The Court also ruled on Soering's claim that his extradition would violate the guarantee of a fair
trial contained in Article 6, and the Article 13 guarantee of an effective remedy for Convention violations
before a national authority. It ruled that the absence of legal aid in Virginia for collateral death penalty
appeals was not such a "flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country" as to violate Article 6, and
that British judicial review of the executive's extradition decision was not so restrictive as to deny a
domestic remedy and violate Article 13. Id. at 45, 47-48.
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3. "Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment"
The European Court also ruled that the "death row phenomenon"
constituted "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" under Article 3.
This third holding was the most dramatic part of the case. Without a
substantive Article 3 violation, the Court's language on requested state
responsibility and standard of proof for potential violations would have been
no more than interesting dicta. The Court did not hold that the death penalty
violated Article 3 per se. It explicitly refused to go that far, as it noted that
Article 2 of the European Convention permits states to impose capital
punishment. 3 3 Instead, the Court limited itself to finding that the manner in
which the death penalty was imposed in Virginia constituted inhuman or
degrading punishment. 1
34
The Soering opinion's Article 3 holding contradicted an earlier decision
by the European Commission. In 1984 the Commission had screened an
application that bore a close resemblance to Soering's claims. 35 The state
of California sought the extradition from the United Kingdom of E.M.
Kirkwood, who had allegedly killed two men in San Francisco and had been
arrested upon arrival at Heathrow Airport. Under California law, conviction
on a double-murder charge could bring a death sentence. After exhausting his
appeals in U.K. courts, Kirkwood applied to the Commission to block
extradition, arguing that the death row phenomenon was inhuman and
degrading punishment. The Commission disagreed by one vote. Although it
described the conditions of confinement and the anxiety-inducing effects of the
lengthy death-penalty appeals process as "grave" and "severe," 136 the
Commission held that such treatment did not violate Article 3 for two reasons.
First, California law allowed the applicant to accelerate the appeals process.
Second, the applicant would have the opportunity to challenge the death row
phenomenon in U.S. courts under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
133. Article 2(1) ofthe European Convention states: "No one shall be deprived ofhis life intentionally,
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty
is provided by law." European Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, § 1. The Court further noted that nearly
all member states had abolished the death penalty or no longer imposed it, a fact that might suggest an
implicit agreement to "abrogate the exception provided for under Article 2(1) and hence to remove a textual
limit on the scope for evolutive interpretation of Article 3." Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40.
It ultimately refused to infer such an informal amendment, since only 16 of the 21 member states had
ratified Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention (which abolishes capital punishment in times of peace),
thus indicating that not all parties oppose capital punishment. Id. at 41.
134. Although the European Court previously had no occasion to apply this reasoning to capital
punishment, the Court recognized in Tyrer that the interval between sentencing and punishment can induce
psychological effects that violate Article 3. Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 33 (1978). For
further discussion, see supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
135. Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10479/83, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158
(1984).
136. Id. at 186, 188, 190.
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the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Commission therefore
found Kirkwood's application inadmissible and upheld the United Kingdom's
decision to extradite him. 13 7 The Commission's concerns about the death row
phenomenon in Kirkwood, however, contributed to the European Court's
finding in Soering that the death row phenomenon was "inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."138
There are several explanations for these disparate results in such similar
cases. First, the European Court is not bound to follow Commission precedent
or its own case law, although it generally gives substantial weight to both.'
Second, some of the factual particularities of Soering, which were absent in
Kirkwood, played an important role in the European Court's decision that
extradition would violate the Article 3 prohibition against inhuman or
degrading treatment: it found that Soering's youth and alleged mental disorder
would make his stay on death row particularly traumatic. 4° Finally, the
Court gave some weight to the submission of an extradition request by West
Germany, which had no death penalty and was willing to prosecute Soering,
who was a West German national. This gave the U.K. Foreign Secretary a
reasonable alternative to surrendering Soering to authorities in Virginia.14 t
One commentator has suggested that, but for such unusual facts, the
European Court would not have invalidated Soering's extradition, and therefore
the Court meant to limit its ruling on the death row phenomenon to the most
egregious cases." Such a narrow interpretation, however, ignores the
Soering Court's rejection of a major argument advanced in Kirkwood by the
Commission in favor of extradition. The Commission in Kirkwood had found
that the California appeals process was designed to protect the death row
inmate, and that the inmate might choose to accelerate the process by waiving
his appeal rights. In contrast, the Soering Court noted that:
137. Following extradition, Kirkwood was tried on two counts of first-degree murder. The jury split
11-1. Kirkwood pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder on the eve of his second trial and
received a sentence of 17 years to life. UPI, July 24, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
138. See Soering v. United Kingdom, Eur. Comm'n H.R., App. No. 88/14,038, slip op. (Jan. 19,
1989) (6-5 majority opinion), reprinted in part in Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 54-83
(1989). The Commission's majority opinion in Soering refused to find that the death row phenomenon
violated Article 3. However, it held on other grounds that the application was admissible. Id. at 62-63.
See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's ruling on Soering's application).
The five dissenters argued, in three separate opinions, that the death row phenomenon violated Article
3. Id. at 73-74 (Forwein, dissenting), 77 (Trechsel, dissenting), 79-80 (Danelius, dissenting). The European
Court adopted this view unanimously. The Court determined that the death row phenomenon was both
"inhuman" and "degrading" and constituted both "treatment" and "punishment," since it generally used
the four terms together ("inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment") or shortened the formula to "ill-
treatment." Soeing, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39-40, 44-45. As Richard Lillich has pointed out, this
result is ironic, because the Court is generally considered more conservative than the Commission. See
Lillich, supra note 100, at 140.
139. See MERRILS, supra note 64, at 13.
140. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 43.
141. See id. at 44.
142. See Lillich, supra note 100, at 145.
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However well-intentioned and even potentially beneficial is the provision of the
complex of post-sentence procedures in Virginia, the consequence is that the
condemned prisoner has to endure for many years the conditions on death row and
the anguish and mounting tension of living in the ever-present shadow of death."
A death row inmate will naturally cling to life by fully exploiting the appeals
process; it would thus be unfair to force him to choose between abandoning
his appeal rights, thereby hastening his execution, and enduring the death row
phenomenon. 144
V. RESPONSES TO T=E SOEPING DECISION
The European Court in Soering placed international human rights law on
a collision course with traditional extradition law. The decision presented the
prospect that judges in extradition proceedings might abandon the traditional
rules of non-inquiry and deference to the head of state and conduct their own
examination of the human rights records of requesting states.145 The Soering
decision thus provides national court judges with the reasoning and principles
necessary to block an extradition on humanitarian grounds.
The extent to which the Soering decision has altered and expanded the
judicial role in extradition cases remains unclear. The decision has set off a
judicial debate on the issue in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United
States. In the United Kingdom, the ruling has received only grudging
acceptance. In Canada, a slim plurality on the highest court recently gave
Soering a narrow construction over vociferous dissents that called for a broader
reading. In the United States, two federal district courts have embraced the
Soering approach, although a federal circuit court has curbed their efforts.
A. The United Kingdom: Bowing Reluctantly to the European Court
The Soering decision has had two effects in the United Kingdom. First,
it has directly affected the government's extradition practice. The Foreign
143. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42 (emphasis added).
144. The European Court did not even mention the other argument in Kirkwood- the fugitive's ability
to contest the death row phenomenon in a U.S. court under "the cruel and unusual punishment" clause of
the U.S. Constitution. This omission was probably less an oversight than a recognition of the U.S. Supreme
Court's increasing reluctance to halt executions on Eighth Amendment grounds. See Wilkens v. Missouri,
109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989) (capital punishment for individuals who committed capital crime at 16 or 17 years
of age did not violate Eighth Amendment); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit death penalty as disproportionate in case of defendant whose participation in felony that
resulted in murder is major and whose mental state is one of reckless indifference); Profitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976) (imposition of death penalty not per se cruel and unusual punishment) (plurality); see also
Richmond v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 933, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1990) (fulfillment of death sentence after defendant
has spent 16 years on death row did not violate Eighth Amendment).
145. See supra notes 35-61 and accompanying text (discussing rules of non-inquiry and judicial
deference).
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Secretary ultimately extradited Soering, but only after obtaining from the
Virginia prosecutors concrete assurances against seeking the death penalty, and
it is likely that the practice of seeking such requests will continue. Second, the
Soering decision has influenced the manner in which U.K. courts decide
extradition cases. Two recent court decisions suggest that U.K. courts will
reluctantly accept Soering, perhaps recognizing the United Kingdom's treaty
obligations under the European Convention, but also suggest that these courts
will read the decision narrowly so as to limit its impact.
1. Impact on Executive Extradition Practices
Following the Soering decision the British government faced a dilemma.
If it abided by the decision and refused to extradite Soering, it would violate
the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, which requires extradition in death penalty
cases as long as the requesting nation provides assurances that are satisfactory
to the requested nation."4 The United Kingdom had been ready to surrender
Soering despite the flimsy assurances offered by Virginia prosecutors, and
some commentators at the time predicted that a refusal to extradite Soering
would bring reprisals from U.S. authorities when the United Kingdom
requested the extradition of I.R.A. terrorists. 47 On the other hand, the
United Kingdom would breach its obligations under the European Convention
if it extradited Soering.
Faced with this dilemma, the United Kingdom opted to honor its European
Convention obligations. In a diplomatic note dated July 28, 1989, one month
after the Soering decision, the British Foreign Secretary informed the Virginia
prosecutors that the United Kingdom would not extradite Soering to face
capital murder charges.'48 Shortly thereafter, the prosecutors agreed to try
Soering on first-degree murder rather than capital murder, and the United
Kingdom surrendered him. 49
146. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 26, art. 4.
147. Extradition Balance Upset, L. Soc'Y's GAzETTE, July 12, 1989, at 3.
148. The Foreign Secretary stated that:
Mr. Soering will be surrendered on condition that he will not be tried for capital murder or any
other offence the penalty for which may include the imposition of the death penalty .... Her
Majesty's Government have concluded that if Mr. Soering were prosecuted for the offence of
capital murder in the State of Virginia, there is no assurance that the State of Virginia could
provide in his case that would ensure that the death penalty would not be imposed on Mr.
Soering, or that it would not be carried out. Consequently, in accordance with the terms of
Article IV of the Extradition Treaty, the surrender of Mr. Soering in respect of capital murder
is refused.
Diplomatic Note from Her Majesty's Government to the U.S. State Department, quoted in Re Soering's
Application, CO/1258/89 (Q.B.) (1989), available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File.
149. Soering was tried and convicted on two charges of first-degree murder. On June 21, 1990, a jury
in Bedford, Virginia sentenced him to two life terms. Soeing, Executions, Landbank Among 1990's Crime
Headlines, UPI, Dec. 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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The United Kingdom's insistence on absolute assurances reversed its
previous practice, as evidenced in the Kirkwood case. Only five years earlier,
the Foreign Secretary had extradited E.M. Kirkwood without requiring
prosecutors in California to renounce their plans for a capital sentence. 50
The Foreign Secretary may switch its position at its discretion or may limit
the application of the Soering rule to extraditions with similarly egregious
facts. Given the powerful precedent set by acceptance of the authority of the
European Court, however, it seems likely that Soering will continue to
influence U.K. government decisions in extradition cases.
2. Soering in the Courts
The European Court's decision in Soering affected the U.K. bench in two
ways. First, it effectively reversed the rulings of the judges who had certified
Soering's extradition. Second, it repudiated the extradition tradition formulated
by U.K. judges, who have generally been even less active than their Canadian
and U.S. counterparts, and given greater deference to government
determinations on whether to surrender a fugitive. 51
It thus is not surprising that the decision received only grudging acceptance
in the first two U.K. cases that cite it. The first case, Re Osman,52 involved
a request by Hong Kong for the extradition of Osman, who had allegedly
committed murder in Hong Kong. Relying on Soering, Osman argued before
the divisional court that his extradition would violate Article 6 of the European
Convention, which provides guarantees of a fair trial.'53 The court did not
directly apply the Soering decision, because it found a lack of evidence to
support Osman's claim. 54 It did not ignore Soering, however, nor did it rule
out that case's significance for extradition law-two important steps for a
150. Reuters, Apr. 19, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (discussing California
Superior Court judge's ruling that United States was required only to present British objections to death
penalty at execution).
151. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
152. CO/252/90 (Q.B.) (1990), available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File.
153. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 6. Soering had raised this claim together with his Article
3 claim. While the European Court found no Article 6 violation, it did allow for that possibility in future
cases: "The Court does not exclude that an issue might exceptionally be raised under Article 6 by an
extradition decision in circumstances where the fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial
of a fair trial in the requesting country." Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45 (1989). For further
discussion, see supra note 132.
154. The court noted: "We do not decide whether this is or can be a factor to be considered by this
court. Suffice it to say there is not here anything which could suggest the risk of 'a flagrant denial' such
as the [Soering] Court thought might raise an Article 6 issue." Re Osman, CO/252/90 (Q.B.) (1990),
available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File, at *38.
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judicial system that had once refused to consider the European Convention
because it had not been adopted by Parliament. 55
The second U.K. case citing Soering, Ex parte Zia Mehmet Binbasi,
involved a challenge to the deportation and denial of political asylum to a
homosexual from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."5 6 The appellant
asserted that Soering barred extradition of an individual to a state that violated
the European Convention in a way that would harm him; he argued that by
criminalizing homosexual behavior Cyprus failed to protect the rights of
consenting adult homosexuals, thus breaching Article 8 of the European
Convention. The immigration court did not challenge this reading of Soering.
Instead, it found that the government's denial of political asylum was not so
unreasonable as to warrant judicial interference. This finding was based on the
fact that the European Court had never ruled on the status under the European
Convention of Northern Cyprus's laws barring homosexual activity.'
5 7
Furthermore, the appellant had not proved with certainty that he would engage
in homosexual activity in Cyprus, let alone be punished for it."15
B. Canada: A Narrow Reading in a Divided Court
On September 26, 1991 the Canadian Supreme Court, in two sharply
divided 4-3 rulings, 59 held that the Canadian Justice Minister's planned
extradition to the United States of two fugitives charged with capital crimes
did not violate the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
(Canadian Charter).16" Both the plurality and the dissenting opinions invoked
Soering, but each side interpreted the case differently.
The cases involved two U.S. citizens who sought to avoid extradition to
the United States. Joseph Kindler was convicted of murder in Pennsylvania
in 1983 and the jury recommended the death penalty. Before formal
155. See R. v. Secretary of State for Home Dep't exparte Kirkwood, 2 All E.R. 390 (Q.B.) (1984)
(since Parliamentnever adopted European Convention, it was not part of British law, and Secretary of State
did not have to consider it).
156. R. v. Secretary of State for Home Dep't exparte Zia Mehmet Binbasi, 1989 Imm. App. R. 595
(Q.B.), available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File.
157. Id. at *18. The immigration court noted without comment applicant's citation of the Dudgeon
Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5 (1981); for further discussion, see supra notes 71-75 and
accompanying text. The court did not explicitly reject Dudgeon, although its ruling leaves the case with
little vitality in the United Kingdom.
158. The immigration court noted:
[Ihe Secretary of State cannot be criticized for failing to act upon the possibility, as yet untested
before the European Court, that Northern Cyprus may be in breach of an Article of the
Convention by continuing to regard as criminal certain types of conduct in which the applicant,
if he returned to Northern Cyprus, might or might not choose to indulge.
Exparte Binbasi, 1989 1mm. App. R. 595, available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File, at *18.
159. Kindler v. Canada, No. 21,321, slip op. (Can. Sept. 26, 1991); Ng v. Canada, No. 21,990, slip
op. (Can. Sept. 26, 1991).
160. CAN. CoNsT. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
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sentencing, however, Kindler escaped to Canada.'61 In 1985, Charles Ng fled
to Canada shortly before prosecutors in California charged him with twelve
counts of murder. Conviction on these charges in California could bring the
death sentence. 162
Pennsylvania and California requested extradition pursuant to the
extradition treaty between Canada and the United States (U.S.-Canada
Extradition Treaty)." Article 6 of the treaty, which is similar to Article IV
of the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, allows the requested state to refuse
extradition unless it receives satisfactory assurances that the death penalty will
not be imposed. 164 In response to both requests, after the extradition
magistrate and one habeas court had refused to invalidate the extradition, the
Canadian Minister of Justice ordered surrender without seeking any assurances.
Kindler and Ng each challenged the Minister's decision. The Canadian
Supreme Court consolidated the cases and heard arguments on February 21,
1991. Kindler and Ng argued in their appeals (together with intervenor
Amnesty International) that extradition without assurances in death penalty
cases violated section 7 (right to life and liberty)'65 and section 12
(prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment)6 6 of the Canadian Charter. The
Court ruled in favor of extradition in both cases, but produced two plurality
and two dissenting opinions reflecting the sharp divisions among the
justices. 167
161. Appellant's Factum at 1, Kindler v. Canada, No. 21,321 (Can., argued Feb. 21, 1991) (on file
with author).
162. Katherine Bishop, Murder Suspect's Bid to Stay in Canada Tests Pact, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 13,
1991, at A18.
163. Treaty on Extradition, Mar. 22, 1976, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983 [hereinafter U.S.-Canada
Extradition Treaty].
164. Article 6 of the U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty states:
When the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the laws of the
requesting State and the laws of the requested State do not permit such punishment for that
offense, extradition may be refused unless the requesting State provides such assurances as the
requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed,
shall not be executed.
Id. art. 6.
165. Section 7 of the Canadian Charter states: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security
of the person and the right -not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice." CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 7.
166. Section 12 of the Canadian Charter states: "Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment." Id. § 12.
167. Kindler v. Canada, No. 21,321, slip op. (Can. Sept. 26, 1991). Although only Kindler's name
appears in the caption, these opinions in fact dispose of the companion case, Ng v. Canada, No. 21,990,
slip op. (Can. Sept. 26, 1991), as well.
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1. The Plurality's Narrow Reading of Soering
The two plurality opinions, by Justices McLachlin and LaForest, dismissed
the claims of Kindler and Ng for similar reasons. First, they denied that
extradition could implicate section 12, interpreting the Canadian Charter to
proscribe only cruel and unusual punishment imposed by Canadian officials.
Since the death penalty would be carried out by officials in Pennsylvania and
California, each held that the sanction could not violate section 12: a contrary
holding would "cast the net of the [Canadian] Charter broadly into
extraterritorial waters."' 68
Justice McLachlin's opinion defined the central issue as whether extradition
without assurances 'would deprive the fugitives of their liberty without
fundamental justice in violation of section 7. To prevail on this issue, the
fugitive had to show that the requesting state presents "'a situation that is
simply unacceptable," 169 or one that "'sufficiently shocks' the Canadian
conscience. ""o This required a balancing test between national norms and
other considerations.'' Appellants and intervenor Amnesty International
argued that extraditing a fugitive to face the death penalty would "shock the
Canadian conscience,"17 and pointed out that the Canadian Parliament had
abolished the death penalty for all but a few military offenses in 1976 and had
rejected a proposal to reinstate the death penalty for civilian crimes in
1987.13 Justice McLachlin refused to interpret this legislative activity as an
unequivocal statement that the death penalty shocked the Canadian collective
conscience, since the vote on reinstatement had been close, 74 reflecting a
lack of consensus." 5
Other considerations mitigated any shock to the Canadian conscience.
Justice McLachlin noted that the legal systems in the requesting U.S. states
were products of democratic governance and include procedural safeguards
similar to those provided by Canadian law. 176 He argued that courts in the
168. Kindler, slip op. at 12 (McLachlin, J.) (plurality opinion).
169. Id. at 16 (quoting United States v. Allard, 40 D.L.R.4th 104 (1988) (Can.)).
170. Id. (quoting Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 40 (1987) (Can.)).
171. The plurality concluded that:
At the end of the day, the question is whether the provision or action in question offends the
Canadian sense of what is fair, right and just, bearing in mind the nature of the offence and the
penalty, the foreign justice system and considerations of comity and security, and according due
latitude to the Minister to balance the conflicting considerations.
Id. at 16 (McLachlin, J.) (plurality opinion).
172. See, e.g., Appellant's Factum at 5, Kindler v. Canada, No. 21,321 (Can., argued Feb. 21, 1991)
(on file with author).
173. See, e.g., Appellant's Factum at29-31, Ng v. Canada, No. 21,990 (Can., argued Sept. 26, 1991)
(on file with author); Appellant's Factum at 16, Kindler v. Canada, No. 21,321 (Can., argued Feb. 21,
1991) (on file with author).
174. The vote was 148-127. Kindler, slip op. at 19 (McLachlin, J.) (plurality opinion).
175. Id. at 4 (LaForest, J.) (plurality opinion).
176. Id. at 9; see also id. at 20 (McLachlin, J.) (plurality opinion).
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requested state could go no further in their inquiry into conditions in the
requesting country. "[W]e require a limited but not absolute degree of
similarity between our laws and those of the reciprocating state."'"
Moreover, international comity and the interest of international law
enforcement weighed in favor of extradition. Both opinions gave great weight
to the Justice Minister's contention that failure to extradite would create a "safe
haven" for felons charged with capital crimes, who would flock to Canada to
be shielded from punishment. 7 This would be especially true for U.S.
criminals, such as Kindler and Ng, who could easily cross the long, relatively
porous border between the United States and Canada.
Both plurality opinions implicitly rejected two key aspects of Soering. First,
the plurality refused to extend state responsibility beyond Canada's national
borders and to apply section 12 to extradition, to avoid giving extraterritorial
effect to the Canadian Charter. This decision departed from the broad holding
in Soering that the requested state has a responsibility to ensure that the
fugitive's human rights are respected, and may not extradite if it is aware of
a substantial risk of violation in the requesting country. 79 Second, Justice
LaForest's swing opinion (conferring the plurality) rejected the most innovative
part of the Soering holding: the idea that the death row phenomenon violated
human rights. He adopted instead the European Commission's view in
Kirkwood: the time-consuming death penalty appeals process was designed to
protect the prisoner, who could voluntarily choose to forego its pressures. 80
Neither plurality opinion, however, disavowed Soering unequivocally.
Justice LaForest, despite his skeptical view of the death row phenomenon,
seemed to accept Soering for the proposition that extradition in capital cases
where the fugitive was a youth or mentally disabled might violate the
"fundamental justice" requirement of section 7.t1 This left the possibility
that a future case with facts closer to those in Soering might warrant a judicial
refusal to extradite. Justice LaForest's approving citation of even an emaciated
version of Soering is significant as an acknowledgement, however limited, of
Soering's persuasive value from a court beyond the reach of the European
Convention.' 82
177. Id. at 9 (McLachlin, J.) (plurality opinion).
178. Id. at 21 (McLachlin, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 9 (LaForest, J.) (plurality opinion).
179. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
180. "It would be ironic if delay caused by the appellant's taking advantage of the full and generous
avenue of the appeals available to him should be viewed as a violation of fundamental justice." Kindler,
slip op. at 12 (LaForest, J.) (plurality opinion).
181. Id. at 8.
182. This was not the first time the Canadian Supreme Court invoked jurisprudence produced under
the European Convention. See Schmidt v. The Queen, 39 D.L.R.4th 18, 39 (1987) (Can.) (citing Altun
v. Germany, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611 (1983) (Commission report)).
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2. The Dissents' Broader Interpretation of Soering
Three justices dissented sharply in Kindler and Ng in two dissenting
opinions. Justice Sopinka agreed with the plurality that section 7, rather than
section 12, was the Canadian Charter provision applicable to these cases, but
disagreed with the plurality's resolution of the section 7 issue. In his opinion,
Canada's abolition of the death penalty in 1976 and its reaffirmation of this
abolition in 1987 signaled that "public policy in Canada ... stands clearly
opposed to the death penalty. "  As such, extradition without assurances
would "shock[ ] the conscience"' and thus deprive the fugitive of liberty
in violation of "fundamental justice." Justice Sopinka also attacked the safe-
haven argument, arguing that the plurality presented a false choice between
extraditing without assurances and not extraditing at all.' 5 There was a
further possibility offered by Article 6 of the U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty:
Canada could seek assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed and
extradite on that basis. 86
The other dissenter, Justice Cory, viewed the prohibition in section 12
against cruel and unusual punishment as the legal provision most appropriate
for analyzing the two cases. He argued that section 12 barred extradition when
a fugitive faced capital punishment for four reasons: the historical reluctance
of Canadian juries to impose the death penalty; 7 Canada's abolition of the
death penalty in 1976 and its affirmation of that step in 1987;181 Canada's
ratification of international covenants for the protection of human rights;8 9
and the universal principle of human dignity. Justice Cory interpreted the
Soering holding broadly, refused to limit its scope to Jens Soering's individual
circuistances.1 " He conceded that Soering was not binding on the Canadian
Court, but treated it as a persuasive authority indicative of a "judicial trend
183. Kindler, slip op. at 5 (Sopinka, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 4.
185. Under the plurality's analysis, Kindler and Ng would face the death penalty in the United States
or would roam free in Canada. Id. at 6-7 (LaForest, J.) (plurality opinion).
186. Justice Sopinka argued that extradition without violation of the Canadian Charter could be
achieved through negotiation with the United States:
With the cooperation of the requesting state, it is possible to achieve the goals of an effective
extradition system in a manner that does not deprive the fugitive of the protection of the Charter.
In such circumstances, it is fundamentally unjust for the Canadian Government to extradite a
fugitive without at least seeking assurances against the imposition of the death penalty.
Id. at 5 (Sopinka, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 11-13 (Cory, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 27.
189. Id. at22. Justice Cory cited several international covenants, including the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. I, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948),
and the U.N. Torture Convention, supra note 85. Kindler, slip op. at 21-24 (Cory, J., dissenting). Neither
of these accords explicitly prohibits capital punishment, but both express the general principle of respect
for human life and dignity. However, as Justice Cory pointed out, Canada voted in favor of the Second
Optional Protocol, which outlaws capital punishment in the territory of its signatories. Id.
190. Id. at 43.
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in the consideration of extradition cases where a fugitive may be subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment or treatment." 191 To embrace Soering's
expanded vision of state responsibility, Justice Cory pointed to similar language
used in section 12 of the Charter192 and Article 3 of the European
Convention. 93 The European Court in Soering had interpreted the use of "to
subject," which appears in both provisions, to mean "to put at risk of" in the
extradition context. 194 Justice Cory concluded that the same construction
should be given to section 12 of the Canadian Charter.195
Justice Cory also relied on Soering to support the proposition that potential
or threatened violations of Charter rights demand judicial intervention.
Although he did not specify a standard for evaluating such cases, he cited with
approval the European Court's ruling that a state has a duty not to extradite
where the fugitive faces a "real risk of exposure" to proscribed treatment, or
where an Article 3 violation would be a "foreseeable consequence[ ]" of
extradition. 96 Finally, both dissenters criticized the plurality's reliance on
the safe-haven argument, arguing that there was no evidence to support such
a claim. There had been no exodus of felons to Europe after the European
Court blocked the surrender of Jens Soering. 197
C. The United States: Reexamining the Judicial Role
Soering has had its most dramatic impact in the United States. This
decision has given substance to vague dicta in prior cases concerning the
possibility of applying human rights considerations to extradition.
Consequently, U.S. courts have engaged in a major reexamination of the
judicial role in extradition law. In Ahmad v. Wigen, for example, a federal
district court seeking to expand habeas corpus review cited Soering as
191. Id. at 39.
192. CAN. CoNST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 12;
see supra note 166 (quoting § 12).
193. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 3; see supra note 112 (quoting Article 3).
194. Justice Cory argued that: "The position taken.. .[in Soering] is that a decision to surrender a
fugitive to a country in which that fugitive may face torture, or inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment is a violation of the fugitive's right not to be 'subjected' to such treatment." Kindler, slip op.
at 43 (Cory, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 42 (citing Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1989)). These two cases
involved such severe crimes that Justice Cory could have adopted almost any probability standard for the
imposition of the death penalty to qualify as a "real risk of exposure." The 12 murder charges against Ng
made it highly likely that a court would impose capital punishment, while Kindler's risk was even greater,
since under Pennsylvania law the jury's recommendation of the death penalty binds the sentencing judge.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (1989).
197. Justice Cory noted that criminals often flee for reasons having little to do with one state's
extradition regime: "[filight may often be undertaken [merely] to avoid detection or trial." Kindler, slip
op. at 46 (Cory, J., dissenting).
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respected precedent and relied upon the decision as a guiding framework.'98
While this reasoning was criticized on appeal, the decision indicates Soering's
provoking effect upon U.S. courts reviewing extradition cases. 19 9 Most
recently, in Gill v. Imundi,2" another district court has attempted to reconcile
the different approaches taken in Ahmad. Both Ahmad and Gill suggest that
some U.S. judges are seeking a broader role in extradition cases, a role that
includes consideration of human rights in the requesting country.
1. Ahmad v. Wigen
In Ahmad Israel sought extradition of a Palestinian suspected of bombing
a bus carrying civilians. Ahmad argued before the certifying magistrate that
his alleged crime fell within the political offense exception to the U.S.-Israel
Extradition Treaty.2"' He also argued that Israel had failed to show probable
cause, and that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction. After the magistrate granted
the extradition order, Ahmad raised these objections again before Judge
Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York in a habeas corpus petition,
adding the argument that he would face procedures and treatment "antipathetic
to a federal court's sense of decency" if he were extradited.2"2
Ahmad requested an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that the Israeli
judicial and penal systems would violate his human rights. The U.S.
government opposed the request, arguing that the court should apply the
traditionally narrow scope of habeas corpus review and the rule of non-
inquiry. 3 Judge Weinstein granted the request, and the government
unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.2 ' An unprecedented hearing ensued. For two weeks, Judge
Weinstein heard evidence that included affidavits and documentation on Israeli
legal process and prison conditions, and testimony from six witnesses including
Palestinian experts, Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz, and an
Israeli government representative who certified that Ahmad would not be
subjected to abuse.2"5 Judge Weinstein attempted to square this novel hearing
with the traditional role of the habeas corpus judge in an extradition
198. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 413-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 910 F.2d
1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
199. Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir. 1990).
200. Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
201. Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, U.S.-Isr., art. VI, 14 U.S.T. 1707.
202. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 395 (quoting Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 851 (1960)).
203. See supra notes 21 and 35-39 and accompanying text (outlining traditional review standards).
204. Ahmad, 910 F.2d at 1063.
205. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 395.
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proceeding. He seized on the Gallina "sense of decency" line of cases, 2"
and the few cases that have permitted the fugitive to challenge his surrender
on constitutional grounds.2 7 He suggested a link between the constitutional
defenses and those appealing to decency: an inquiry to determine whether the
requesting state's criminal justice system satisfied the court's sense of decency
would ensure that the court was not being used by the requesting state to
deprive the fugitive of due process rights.208
This due process argument differed from other constitutional arguments
invoked in the extradition context. Previous cases had focused on the actions
of officials in the requested state.2" In Ahmad, by contrast, practices in the
requesting state were at issue. Judge Weinstein bridged this distinction by
drawing on Soering's expanded conception of state responsibility, arguing that
the extradition court has a responsibility to ensure that the conditions awaiting
the fugitive in the requesting country do not violate human rights. 20 He held
that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution applied because a U.S.
court was asked to facilitate an extradition that potentially threatened the
fugitive's human rights.
Judge Weinstein did not, however, measure the conditions awaiting Ahmad
in Israel by U.S. due process standards, and he cited no due process decisions
by U.S. courts.2" Instead, he judged conditions in Israel against international
human rights norms. His primary source for these norms was Soering, which
he discussed extensively under the heading "International Precedent." Judge
Weinstein stated that "Soering constitutes an important precedent on the refusal
to extradite because of anticipated torture, cruel conditions of incarceration or
lack of due process at trial in the requesting country. It reflects a persuasive
though non-binding international standard."212 This assessment was a slight
overstatement of Soering,1 3 which dealt with lack of due process at trial in
206. See Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980); United States ex rel. Bloomfield v.
Gengler, 507 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
851 (1960). For a discussion of the facts and opinion in Gallina, see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying
text.
207. See, e.g., In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984) (permitting constitutional challenge to
extradition yet enforcing extradition order).
208. Judge Weinstein denied that such an inquiry infringed on the sovereignty of other states:
It should be emphasized that by conducting such an inquiry, we do not make it "the business of
our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of
another sovereign nation." But neither can another nation use the courts of our country to obtain
power over a fugitive intending to deny that person due process. We cannot blind ourselves to
the foreseeable and probable results of the exercise of our jurisdiction.
Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 410 (citations omitted).
209. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
210. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 414.
211. The Gallina decision's "sense of decency" language derived not from the Due Process Clause
but from vague principles of equity, and the decision never explicitly mentioned the U.S. Constitution.
212. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 414.
213. See supra note 132 (discussing Soering's treatment of Article 6 "fair trial" issue).
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dicta only, but it enabled Judge Weinstein to draw notions of due process from
international human rights law rather than U.S. constitutional precedents, in
order to legitimize his unprecedented injection of human rights concerns into
an extradition case. Judge Weinstein also used Soering to guide his inquiry into
human rights conditions in the requesting state. He quoted a passage from
Soering to emphasize the need to balance human rights concerns against
international law enforcement. 14
Judge Weinstein's view on the degree to which extradition judges should
defer to decisions of the government departed substantially from previous
rulings. He recognized that courts should treat the State Department's decision
to present an extradition request as a presumption that the requesting state will
treat the fugitive fairly. He added an important caveat, however, that "[t]here
may be instances where immediate political, military or economic needs of the
United States induce the State Department to ignore the rights of the accused.
Should such cases occur, the courts must be prepared to act."215 A habeas
corpus petitioner could rebut the presumption by presenting strong evidence
that his extradition would expose him to treatment violating international norms
of human rights.216 The petitioner would bear the burden of going forward
with the evidence-the burden of establishing a prima facie case. 217 Judge
Weinstein ruled that Ahmad had met this burden, based on reports of Israeli
torture of Palestinians accused of violent acts against Israelis in the occupied
territories. 218
Judge Weinstein then turned to the issue of standard of proof. He required
Ahmad to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he would face unfair
treatment in Israel, thus declining to impose the higher standard of "clear and
convincing" evidence. Perhaps mindful of the potential tension between his
ruling and traditional judicial deference (which would have required a higher
214. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1989).
JudgeWeinstein's quotation of thepassage reveals that he envisioned ajudicial role in extradition cases
that would balance competing policy considerations, a task judges perform in nearly every other legal
domain:
[J]ust as national policies and international norms are taken into account by American courts
ascertaining the scope of the political offense exception ... so too must these considerations
enter into the assessment of whether the likelihood of particular treatment in the requesting
country constitutes such a violation of due process and fundamental fairness as to prevent
extradition.
Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 414. Judge Weinstein also listed the factors set forth in Soering for assessing the
severity of ill-treatment in the requesting country: courts should consider "'all the circumstances of the
case, such as the nature and context of the treatment or punishment, the manner and method of its
execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health
of the victim.'" Id. (quoting Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39).
215. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 415.
216. Id.
217. "If petitioner makes such a threshold showing, the rule of non-inquiry yields and an evidentiary
hearing may be conducted on the issue of probable due process to the accused in the requesting country.'
d.I
218. fI at 416.
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standard), Judge Weinstein noted: "We are not, as apparently British courts
are, limited to deciding that 'no reasonable secretary of state could have made
an order for [extradition] in the circumstances." 219 Judge Weinstein ruled
that Ahmad had failed to carry this burden: no extradited prisoner had ever
suffered abuse by Israeli officials, and the Israeli government's assurances that
Ahmad would receive fair treatment were credible. He also approved the
government's decision to seek such assurances from Israel because "the
extraditing nation has a continuing interest in assuring fairness to the
extraditee."I Having found the other grounds for challenging the extradition
order without merit, Judge Weinstein denied Ahmad's habeas corpus
petition.221
2. Ahmad in the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit affirmed Judge Weinstein's denial of the habeas corpus
petition on appeal, but sharply criticized his broad vision of habeas corpus
review in extradition cases: "A consideration of the procedures that will or
may occur in the requesting country is not within the purview of a habeas
corpus judge .... Indeed, there is substantial authority for the proposition
that this is not a proper matter for consideration by the certifying judicial
officer. "In Instead, the Second Circuit held that the proper forum in which
to raise human rights concerns in extradition cases is before the Secretary of
State. 3 The court concluded that Judge Weinstein should not have conducted
a hearing on the treatment Ahmad would face in Israel. 4 Indeed, the court
noted in its closing remarks that there was no need to conduct such an inquiry:
So far as we know, the Secretary [of State] never has directed extradition in the
face of proof that the extraditee would be subjected to procedures or punishment
antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive
of a situation in which a Secretary of State would do so.'
219. Id. (quoting Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1989)).
220. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 417-18.
221. Id. at 420.
222. Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
223. Id. (citing Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980), and Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d
478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976)).
224. The circuit court's decision implied support for an executive model of extradition, requiring
judicial deference to the government's prerogative in foreign policy matters:
Notwithstanding [precedent to the contrary], the district court proceeded to take testimony from
both expert and fact witnesses and received extensive reports, affidavits, and other documentation
concerning Israel's law enforcement procedures and its treatment of prisoners. This, we think,
was improper. The interests of international comity are ill-served by requiring a foreign nation
such as Israel to satisfy a United States district judge concerning the fairness of its laws and the
manner in which they are enforced. It is the function of the Secretary of State to determine
whether extradition should be denied on humanitarian grounds.
Ahmad, 910 F.2d at 1067.
225. Id.
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The court of appeals did not cite Soering, but it apparently thought that the
European Court's decision changed nothing; judges in extradition cases still
could not consider the requesting nation's human rights record. This is the
traditional prevailing argument on judicial involvement in extradition
proceedings. 6 Thus, in response to Judge Weinstein's sharp tug at tradition,
the Second Circuit rolled back even the limited autonomy U.S. judges had
established in cases like Gallina.
3. Gill v. Imundi: Explaining Ahmad
In Gill v. Imundi,227 fugitive Sikhs accused of murder in India sought a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States to block their extradition. They
claimed that they would face biased legal proceedings, torture, and even death
if extradited to India. Judge Sweet of the Southern District of New York
upheld their petition on unrelated grounds, noting that he could not consider
the petitioners' evidence of human rights abuse in India in light of the Second
Circuit's ruling in Ahmad. He agreed, however, with Judge Weinstein's
opinion that the proper scope of habeas corpus review in extradition
proceedings should go beyond a ministerial inquiry to considerations of
constitutional issues and principles of international law. He examined and
found persuasive the petitioners' evidence of ill-treatment of Sikh prisoners
in India, and only reluctantly accepted the Second Circuit's opinion in
Ahmad.228
Judge Sweet read the Extradition Act? 9 as evidence that Congress
intended to give judges, "as members of relatively non-political departments,
an important role in the avoidance of threatened dangers to liberty. "o In
spite of the Second Circuit's decision in Ahmad, he considered the merits of
petitioners' human rights claims. The affidavits and reports detailing abuse of
Sikhs in police custody were a "substantial, chilling proffer from sources with
at least surface credibility [that] had convinced this court of the justification
for further judicial inquiry lest '[w]e ... blind ourselves to the foreseeable
and probable results of the exercise of our jurisdiction."'' The treatment
awaiting these petitioners in India, Judge Sweet argued, was the type of abuse
the Second Circuit considered in Gallina when it wrote that judges could refuse
226. See supra notes 35-61 and accompanying text.
227. 747 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
228. Id. at 1050 ("This lower court, although possessed of an imagination considerably less sanguine
than that which found expression in Ahmad, is bound by that decision .... ) (footnote omitted).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
230. Gill, 747 F. Supp. at 1038.
231. Id. at 1048 (quoting Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd on other
grounds, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990)).
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to certify extradition when the fugitive faced conditions "antipathetic to a
federal court's sense of decency." 2
Judge Sweet wanted to hold a hearing like that held by Judge
Weinstein, 3 but he reluctantly adhered to the Second Circuit's ruling in
Ahmad: "That step is now foreclosed to a habeas court, the promise of
Gallina's dictum recently having been excised, without comment." 4 Judge
Sweet criticized the Second Circuit's decision for abandoning the possibilities
presented by Gallina and exercised in Soering, for trusting the Secretary of
State to safeguard the petitioners' human rights." He further argued that
the Ahmad court's faith in the government did not comport with a previous
Second Circuit ruling on the political offense exception. 6 Thus while he
reluctantly accepted Ahmad's absolute formulation of the rule of non-inquiry
with respect to habeas corpus judges, Judge Sweet refused to accept the Second
Circuit's dicta that extradition magistrates should be barred from scrutinizing
the legal process in the requesting country. 37 He pointed out that there was
no way to enforce such a bar, since a magistrate's refusal to certify extradition
was not subject to appeal by the government. Thus, he suggested, Ahmad bars
only habeas courts, not extradition magistrates, from considering conditions
in the requesting country."
VI. EXTRADITION REFORM: A PROPOSAL
Judges in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States have not
dismissed Soering. Instead, they have utilized and even embraced it. Only one
232. 747 F. Supp. at 1048 (quoting Gallina, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851
(1960)).
233. "Whether evidence would in fact bear out the likelihood of petitioners being subjected to such
treatment would require conducting a hearing. The strength of the proffer provides the substantial warrant
for taking such a step toward re-examination of the rule of non-inquiry, as was contemplated by the Gallina
court." Id. at 1049.
234. Id.
235. Judge Sweet's opinion stated that:
Ahmad does not examine the proffer that was made to the habeas court nor acknowledge the
concern, expressed in the noted past decisions of the circuit, that circumstances might come to
pass where inquiry into such conditions became necessary. Instead the decision appears to block
any such judicial inquiry by a habeas court based on its belief [that the Secretary of State would
not extradite if the fugitive proved that he would face cruel treatment].
Id.
236. Judge Sweet noted that previous decisions in the circuit supported an active judicial role:
[We] recognize[ ] that judgments by the executive branch on extradition matters may, out of
understandable concern for the maintenance of friendly international relations, be constrained
.... It is not apparent from theAhmad opinion why it is so "difficult to conceive" that the same
practical concerns and constraints noted in Mackin might operate in the context of an extradition
determination involving a subject facing procedures or punishment antipathetic to a court's sense
of decency.
Id. at 1050 n.24 (citing In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 133 (2d Cir. 1981)).
237. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
238. 747 F. Supp. at 1050.
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court, the Second Circuit in Ahmad, has unequivocally rejected the notion of
applying Soering-style jurisprudence to extradition law. 9 Other courts have
nonetheless accepted limited versions of the Soering decision by choosing to
distinguish rather than disavow its reasoning. Soering invites a reexamination
of the assumptions and rationales underlying the current extradition regime,
in particular the traditional rules of non-inquiry and judicial deference to the
government. Part VI argues that because these rationales no longer hold true,
courts should follow a new approach to extradition. A court must inquire into
conditions in the requesting state when a fugitive provides a strong showing
that she will face mistreatment upon her surrender. A court would then
evaluate conditions in the requesting state according to international human
rights norms or, in the alternative, according to human rights criteria
established by domestic statutes. The court would refuse to extradite in cases
of mistreatment, unless the requesting state furnished assurances that it would
treat the fugitive fairly. 2"
A. Extradition on Assurances: A Proposal for Human Rights and Extradition
The proposal could be introduced through statutory or treaty reform or
through judicial practice. A statutory provision or treaty clause explicitly
allowing courts in the requested state to hear evidence concerning conditions
in the requesting state would provide a clear legal basis for judicial refusal to
extradite on human rights grounds. However, past statutory revision efforts
have not succeeded in the United States,241 a process of treaty-by-treaty
revision would prove highly cumbersome,242 and no explicit statutory or
treaty provisions currently exist to justify suspension of the rule of judicial
non-inquiry. 243 Yet the Soering, Ahmad, and Gill opinions and the dissents
239. See supra notes 222-226 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit decision).
240. The proposed approach draws from that employed by Judge Weinstein in Ahmad v. Wigen, which
achieved three goals. First, it helped protect Ahmad from violations of his human rights. Second, it
expedited the surrender of a suspected terrorist. Third, it ensured that the Israeli government would not
co-opt judicial authority in an abuse of human rights. Ahmad demonstrates that when a court finds evidence
of a real risk of human rights violations after extradition, the interests of all parties will be protected by
requiring assurances against such treatment.
241. See bills discussed supra notes 30-34.
242. See BAssioUNmsupra note 6, at54-55. Bassiouni favors making substantive changes in extradition
law by domestic statute rather than by treaty since statutory change would provide for greater uniformity,
and would obviate the need to renegotiate scores of bilateral extradition treaties each time Congress desired
a change.
243. The only exception appears to be Article 3(a) of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty between
the United States and the United Kingdom, which allows U.S. judges to scrutinize the criminal justice
system of Northern Ireland to determine whether it is prejudiced against a fugitive. Supplementary
Extradition Treaty, Dec. 23, 1986, U.S.-U.K., art. 3 (a), 132 CONG. REC. S9120 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
The legislative history of this provision undercuts any optimism that the provision might lead to similar
provisions in other treaties. The U.S. Senate adopted the provision in the wake of two controversial
"political offense exception" cases, in which judges refused to extradite I.R.A. members accused of
murdering British officials. See cases cited supra note 27. In addition to stirring legislative reform attempts,
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in Ng and Kindler articulate principles that will support an expanded judicial
role without explicit statutory or treaty authorization. These principles provide
courts with a legal and intellectual framework for incorporating human rights
into extradition law.
Under a regime based on assurances, a fugitive could claim before the
magistrate that if extradited, his human rights would be violated by action of
the requesting state, such as an unfair trial or inhumane treatment. The fugitive
would bear the burden of establishing a prima facie case.2' The magistrate
would then hold an evidentiary hearing on procedures and penal treatment in
the requesting state.24 The magistrate should bar any government testimony
concerning the importance or sensitivity of diplomatic relations between the
requesting and requested countries.2' The magistrate would refuse the
extradition request upon finding that the fugitive had presented a prima facie
case, unless the requesting state provided assurances that the fugitive would
be treated properly.
Each party would have the same recourse as under the current extradition
system in the event of an adverse verdict. If the magistrate found the fugitive's
evidence unpersuasive and granted the extradition request, the fugitive could
petition a higher court for a writ of habeas corpus. If the magistrate denied
these cases led some senators to call for renegotiation of the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty to narrow the
political offense exception. Other senators opposed any narrowing. The resulting compromise restrained
judicial discretion over the treaty's political offense exception but provided for judicial scrutiny of the
criminal justice system in Northern Ireland. Thus the provision for scrutiny of a foreign legal system came
at the cost of, and was essentially a substitute for, judicial control of the political offense determination.
See Kelly D. Talcott, Note, Questions of Justice: U.S. Courts' Powers of Inquiry Under Article 3(a) of
the UnitedStates-UnitedKingdomSupplementary Extradition Treaty, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 474, 475-76
(1987).
244. A preponderance of the evidence standard reflects the fact that extradition is technically a civil,
rather than criminal, matter, Abroad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd on other
grounds, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990), and recognizes the difficulty of proving by "clear and convincing"
evidence the occurrence of future events in a place far removed from the court's jurisdiction. Placing this
burden upon the fugitive recognizes that the executive's decision to seek extradition signals its confidence
that the fugitive will receive fair treatment. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. To rebut this
presumption, the fugitive could submit affidavits and other written exhibits showing a substantial likelihood
of ill-treatment. See Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 415 ("[Pletitioner [may] come forward with a written
submission showing a substantial probability that he or she can rebut the presumption of State Department
propriety in assuming the fairness of judicial process in the requesting country.").
245. Evidence would consist of reports and testimony from experts and representatives of the
requesting state, and government officials from the requested state would be permitted to testify. The
government's presentation of the extradition request indicates its support of the requesting state's petition.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text. At the same time, though, the government also has detailed
information on legal systems in foreign states that should be included in the testimonial evidence. However,
the government's position should not receive any more weight than that of any other expert witness, because
it may have political, economic or diplomatic reasons to skew its testimony. But see Reform of the
Extradition Laws of the United States: Hearings on H.R. 2643 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1983) (testimony of M. Halperin) (arguing for deference
to executive recommendations to be sought by court during hearing process).
246. In Gill v. Imundi, the court chastised the party seeking extradition for raising this issue: "Nor
is it apparent why respondent in this proceeding has taken care to remind the court that this country has
friendly relations with India." 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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extradition, the requesting state could renew its request before another
magistrate.
A magistrate or court would evaluate a fugitive's claim using criteria based
on international human rights standards.247 Legislation proposed in the U.S.
Congress sought to establish basic criteria for determining whether a fugitive
would receive a fair trial abroad.248 However, national courts lacking
statutory guidelines would refer to international law for standards to evaluate
foreign legal systems. Adoption by national courts of the rulings of
international courts and the provisions of U.N. conventions would endow
extradition law with a uniformity it sorely lacks. Moreover, international law
offers a growing body of specific human rights standards against which the
legal systems of requesting nations may be measured.249
B. Defending the Proposal
1. Legal Bases
Soering's expanded conception of state responsibility supplies the most
important justification for judicial scrutiny of human rights in extradition
requests. The requested state has a responsibility under its own law, which
may include constitutional provisions and international treaty commitments,
to ensure that the fugitive's human rights are not violated. This responsibility
may require the requested state to ask what would happen to the fugitive
following extradition. If a fugitive can show that the requesting country is
likely to violate his human rights, then the magistrate or judge has the same
responsibility to refuse extradition as she does to ensure fair, humane treatment
to criminal defendants in her courtroom."0 This process does not give
247. To the extent that courts have previously attempted to scrutinize foreign legal systems, they have
proceeded with no more guidance than that offered by vague pronouncements of "a federal court's sense
of decency," Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960), and "a fair
and impartial trial," Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901). If Soering-style jurisprudence is to be-
come a model for national courts in extradition cases, more specific criteria for judging the judicial and
penal systems of foreign countries are needed. See Kester, supra note 43, at 1482.
248. These criteria included establishing whether the following rights existed: no ex post facto law,
no bill of attainder, right to assistance of defense counsel, right to be present at trial, right to confront
hostile witnesses, right to a compulsory process to secure witnesses, burden of proof on the government,
right to trial by an impartial tribunal, right to be free from self-incrimination and right to a public trial.
Extradition Act of 1984, H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See generally H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1984) (discussing H.R. 3347); Wellington, supra note 39, at 1453.
249. The U.N. Torture Convention, for example, provides a lengthy definition of "torture." See supra
note 85. As discussed earlier, the European Convention and its interpretation by the European Court offer
an entire system of detailed human rights standards. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
Extradition judges on national courts could rely particularly on the European Court's decisions on the
elements of a fair trial. See, e.g., Piersack Case, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at paras. 30-31 (1984).
250. This due process analogy does not require the judge to apply identical standards of fairness to
the fugitive and the criminal defendant. As suggested earlier, courts should apply standards to fugitives
which draw upon international human rights law, while the standards applied to the criminal defendant
128
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extraterritorial effect to domestic law, but merely ensures that judicial authority
is not used to facilitate human rights violations by other states."'
Treaty construction provides a second legal justification for this proposal.
A judge may justify denying an extradition request on the grounds of
anticipated human rights violations in the requesting state by reading a rea-
sonableness requirement into an extradition treaty. A court would interpret the
requested state's agreement to the treaty to exclude implicitly any extraditions
that are unreasonable, including those involving potential human rights
violations .12
Finally, two specific rules of extradition law embody the principle that a
requested country may refuse to surrender a fugitive if his subsequent
treatment would violate its national norms. Many extradition treaties allow the
requested state to seek assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed
or executed if the crime for which the fugitive is requested carries a death
sentence in the requesting state. 3 In addition, the double-criminality rule,
derive from domestic law. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. A judge's obligation to ensure
applicable standards are observed is simply no less binding in the case of the fugitive than it is in that of
the domestic criminal defendant.
251. Judge Weinstein relied on this conception to apply the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution when considering Ahmad's extradition to Israel. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F.
Supp. 389, 411-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990); see also supra
notes 208-209 and accompanying text. Similarly, Justice Cory, dissenting in Kindler and Ng, argued that
the bar against cruel and unusual punishment contained in § 12 of the Canadian Charter extended to all
governmental activity, even if that activity was only incidentally connected'to actual infliction of the
punishment. Justice Cory concluded that § 12 barred the government not only from executing persons who
had committed crimes in Canada, but also from sending fugitives to a forum where they might face capital
punishment. See supra notes 187-195 and accompanying text.
252. Judge Weinstein relied on this rationale in Ahmad:
Treaty obligations will sometimes need to be read and interpreted by the courts of a nation in
the context of the fundamental law of the nation that entered into them .... [Tihis principle,
we emphasize, does not require us to impose the details of our Constitution or procedural system
on a requesting country's judicial system. It does entail an obligation not to extradite people who
face procedures or treatment that "shocks the conscience" ofjurists acting under the United States
Constitution and within our current legal ethos.
Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 411. One commentator calls this a "judicial braking" role for courts. See
Wellington, supra note 39, at 1452 n.41.
Opponents of Soering-style review argue thata government would not consummate an extradition treaty
if it knew the other state would violate the human rights of extradited fugitives. This is most likely to occur
when the risk of violations in the requesting country has increased since the signing of the extradition treaty.
Id. at 1454. Professor Wellington argues that the United States should enter into extradition treaties only
with nations that possess an ideology and judicial system similar to its own. Id. at 1455. To some extent,
he notes, the U.S. government has followed such a policy: as of 1986, it had no extradition treaty with
the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, North Korea, South Korea, or Iran. Id. But he also points
out that, due to the growth of international terrorism, the United States has negotiated extradition treaties
with nations possessing poor human rights records, including Iraq, Turkey, El Salvador, and Haiti. Id.
If, for example, a miliary coup replaces a democratically elected government, a judge could justifiably
scrutinize an extradition request more closely. However, Professor Wellington argues that the government,
not the judiciary, should determine whether such changes have occurred and whether to refuse to cooperate
in extradition. Id. at 1452.
253. See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 26, art. IV; U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty,
supra note 163, art. 6.
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a long-standing tenet of extradition law, provides that no person shall be
extradited unless he has committed an act that constitutes a crime under the
laws of both the requesting and requested states.'54 These rules prevent the
use of a state's legal system and process to impose treatment that is not in
accord with its legal or moral norms.
The fact that courts lack the power to enforce commitments made by
foreign states and that a requesting state could thus provide assurances to win
extradition and then violate those assurances does not undermine an extradition
regime based on assurances.5 Courts can deter breaches by refusing the
next extradition request from the offending state: 6 A court can also enlist
the assistance of the government. 7 An official assigned to monitor a
fugitive's treatment is unlikely to fail to report gross breaches of assurances,
especially if the trial is open to the public. 8
254. SHEARER, supra note 7, at 137. This rule requires only symmetry of offense, not symmetry of
punishment. In the Kindiercase, however, intervenor Amnesty International suggested an alternative reading
of double criminality: the rule requires symmetry of treatment and punishment. See Factum of Intervenor
Amnesty International at 4, Kindler v. Canada, No. 21,990 (Can., argued Feb. 21, 1991) (on file with
author). This suggestion over-extends the rule, which courts have read narrowly to facilitate extradition.
For example, U.S. courts have ruled that the crime in the requesting nation need not bear the same name
as that in the requested nation. See United States v. Stockinger, 269 F.2d 681, 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nora. Rauch v. Stockinger, 361 U.S. 913 (1959) ("[It is] immaterial that the acts in question constitute
the crime of theft and fraud in Canada and the crime of larceny in New York State. It is enough if the
particular acts charged are criminal in both jurisdictions.").
255. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 33, at 163.
256. The effectiveness of retaliatory denials of extradition requests may depend on the requesting
state's governmental structure. Retaliatory denials will deter breach in states with centralized governments,
but they might be less effective in federal systems with prosecutorial authority distributed among several
localities, which in theory can each make or break assurances independently. An extradition court might
feel compelled to treat each prosecutor as a separate requesting "nation," or require that all extradited
fugitives' cases be handled by federal prosecutors in federal courts. Diplomatic and political realities,
however, make it unlikely that regional prosecutors will breach their promises. Doing so would cause
diplomatic embarrassment for the federal government, making the federal government less willing to
cooperate in future extraditions. The federal government must play some role in extradition through its
diplomatic office, and thus it retains some leverage over regional prosecutors even in the most decentralized
federal systems. Moreover, states remain a part of their larger federal unions and are unlikely lightly to
tarnish their nation's international reputation.
257. When Judge Weinstein accepted Israeli assurances, he noted: "The State Department has indicated
that it plans to assign an American representative to consult with petitioner and to observe the prosecution
of the case before, during and after trial.' Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(citing Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963)), aff'd
on other grounds, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990). Judge Weinstein described Jimenez as a case in which
"the Secretary of State conditioned extradition on the understanding that Jimenez would be tried only for
the crimes specified and ordered a representative of the United States government to observe the
proceedings to determine that the condition was not violated."
258. Judge Weinstein foresaw no risk in such an arrangement: "An open trial in a civilian court with
observation by a representative of the United States furnishes ample protection against abuse." Id. at 420.
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2. Normative Bases
The growing recognition of human rights in the international community
supports the increased judicial scrutiny of human rights in extradition
requests. 9 It is increasingly difficult in this environment for judges to ignore
the consequences of certifying extradition to a country with a poor human
rights record. This concern over human rights questions the wisdom of leaving
the protection of those rights solely to the government of the requested state.
It is misleading to speak of government discretion in extradition cases since
a government is unlikely to make discretionary exceptions to terms of a treaty
it negotiated itself. ° Further, very few treaties allow for denial of
extradition based on treatment in the requesting state.26' The government may
be reluctant to deny an extradition on human rights grounds not already
included in the terms of the treaty, such as procedural unfairness or cruel penal
treatment, no matter how meritorious the claims.262 Because human rights
are not merely factors to be weighed in making foreign policy, but instead are
inalienable entitlements worth protecting for their own sake, the unsupervised
"balancing" of a fugitive's fate against diplomatic considerations is inherently
suspect. As Judge Weinstein pointed out, "there may... be instances where
immediate political, military or economic needs of the United States induce
the State Department to ignore the rights of the accused."263 It is precisely
for these circumstances that judicial review must be available.
While the Second Circuit found it difficult to imagine a scenario in which
the Secretary of State would extradite a fugitive who faced violation of his
human rights, it is in fact difficult to imagine a situation in which the executive
could consider the rights of a fugitive independent of diplomatic pressures. If
it were trying to court favor with that nation for military or economic reasons,
259. Compare U.N. Torture Convention, supra note 85, with European Convention, supra note 112,
art. 3.
260. See Note, ExecutiveDiscretion inExtradition, 62 CoLuM. L. REv. 1313, 1315-16 (1962) (noting
that neitherjudicial opinions nor ExtraditionActof 1848, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1988), set direct limits
on government's discretion whether to surrender in face of absolute treaty obligation, and concluding that
Extradition Act "should probably be interpreted to grant the [government] only the limited discretion to
differ from the courts in the matter of treaty interpretation').
261. Some treaties allow for denial of extradition in death penalty cases. See, e.g., U.S.-U.K.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 26, art. IV. For the text of Article IV, see supra note 59. Beyond death
penalty exceptions, however, only one provision among U.S. treaties allows for judicial scrutiny of the
requesting nation's legal system: the Supplementary Extradition Treaty between the United States and the
United Kingdom, containing special provisions on Northern Ireland. See Supplementary Extradition Treaty,
supra note 243, art. 3(a).
262. See Anderson, supra note 33, at 160-62. Between 1941 and 1962, the U.S. Secretary of State
refused to extradite after certification by the magistrate on only two occasions. See Note, supra note 260,
at 1328. In both cases, the Secretary justified denial on the basis of narrow, technical grounds based on
treaty provisions rather than on broad-based governmental discretion. Id. at 1316, 1328.
263. Abmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 415 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted), aff'd on other
grounds, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
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the executive might be tempted to overlook human rights violations in the
requesting country.? 4
In these cases the fugitive becomes a pawn in a geostrategic chess game.
If extradition affects individual rights and such rights are important in
themselves, a competence rationale calls for greater judicial involvement and
less executive discretion. 6 The judiciary is better positioned to assess the
adequacy of any assurances that a fugitive's human rights will be safeguarded,
because the government may favor expediency over justice, particularly when
evaluating assurances from friendly nations. In Soering, for example, the U.K.
court was required to defer to its foreign minister's assessment of assurances
given by Virginia prosecutors,266 whereby the prosecutors merely promised
to inform the sentencing judge of the British government's opposition to the
death penalty. Such an assurance represented no more than diplomatic politesse
between the United Kingdom and the United States and did nothing to protect
Soering from death row. The European Court held the assurances inadequate
and refused to rely on them to uphold Soering's extradition under the European
Convention. 267 Following this ruling, the British Foreign Minister amended
his position and agreed to surrender Soering only if the state of Virginia
promised not to seek a death sentence. 68 It took an external human rights
court to force the British government to obtain the guarantees necessary to
protect the fugitive's human rights.
3. The Political Question Doctrine
Courts generally defer to elected officials because they view extradition
as a political question of foreign policy.269 Yet the notion that extradition
principally constitutes a foreign policy issue is anachronistic.27 Extradition
264. See, e.g., In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 133 (2d Cir. 1981) (executive control of political offense
determination might eviscerate exception "in practice in the case of extradition treaties with nations with
which we are allied or whose favor we especially desire'); Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1050 n.24
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("ITihe same practical concerns and constraints noted in Mackin might operate in the
context of an extradition determination involving a subject facing procedures or punishment antipathetic
to a court's sense of decency.').
265. See SHEARER, supra note 7, at 197; Lubet, supra note 18, at 284.
266. The Queen's Bench court noted that the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty probably contemplated
firmer commitments, but felt obliged to defer to the government's acceptance of U.S. assurances. See Re
Soering, 1988 Crim. L. Rep. 307 (Q.B.), available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File.
267. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) at 38-39 (1989).
268. In the end, Virginia authorities agreed to the new arrangement, sparing Soering the prospect of
capital punishment and the associated "death row phenomenon." See supra note 148 and accompanying
text.
269. See supra notes 24-30and accompanying text (analyzing application of political question doctrine
to extradition).
270. Two hundred years ago extradition, and more generally the treatment of individuals by foreign
nations, occupied a more central role in foreign affairs. Incidents in which foreign nations infringed the
rights of individuals travelling abroad triggered angry reactions and tended to stir calls for war. The
founders of the United States worried that such incidents might embroil them in the foreign entanglements
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is an infrequent proceeding between states that directly affects a relatively
small number of people,27 and extradition policy rarely arises in the context
of foreign relations. 2' While a state may have a policy-driven interest in
ensuring escaped fugitives are expeditiously returned, its interest in the return
of any single fugitive, and thus in the outcome of any particular extradition
request, is often negligible.2'
Treaties between foreign states directing the physical transfer of individuals
define extradition law, and these elements require an active role by the
government. Yet neither element makes extradition primarily a matter of
against which George Washington cautioned in his farewell address. See George Washington's Final Manu-
script of the Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796) in FEux GILBERT, To THE FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS
OF EARLY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 145 (1961) ("'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alli-
ances, with our portion of the foreign world."). The founders' response to this danger was often to entrust
the judiciary with the resolution of controversies involving the U.S. government's treatment of foreigners.
For example, the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988), adopted in 1789 and still in force today,
allows foreigners with grievances against the U.S. government to bring suit for damages in federal court.
See Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
62 (1988).
The idea of allocating certain sensitive foreign policy issues to the judiciary, conceived during the
isolationist years of the United States, continues to surface today. Courts rely upon it to justify judicial
resolution of political offense exception cases. See, e.g., Fain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513 (7th Cir. 1981)
("[A]llowing judges, rather than the Executive, to make the political offense determination 'permits the
Executive Branch to remove itself from political and economic sanctions which might result if other nations
believe the United States lax in the enforcement of its treaty obligations.'") (quoting Steven Lubet & Morris
Czaczkes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIpINOLOGY 193, 200 (1980)).
271. Between 1945 and 1960, for example, U.S. magistrates certified an estimated 137 extradition
requests-an average of less than 10 per year. See Note, supra note 260, at 1313 n.1. This figure does
not include requests that were made but not certified, but it is nonetheless quite small, considering that the
United States is party to over 100 extradition treaties. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 31. Apprehensions
and renditions of alleged criminals, particularly terrorists, are achieved far more commonly by deportation
than by extradition in international practice. See Arthur W. Evans, The Apprehension and Prosecution of
Offenders: Some Current Problems in Legal Aspects of International Terrorism, in LEGAL AsPECTS OF THE
CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 493-94 (Arthur W. Evans & John F. Murphy eds., 1978).
However, recent data indicate increased extradition activity. For example, the U.S. Justice Department
estimates that during fiscal year 1990, the United States extradited some 150 fugitives and made 600
extradition requests to foreign nations. Telephone Interview with Rex Young, International Affairs Division,
United States Department of Justice (Feb. 11, 1992).
272. But see, e.g., James F. Clarity, Ireland to Tighten Law on Fugitives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26,
1991, at A2 (describing Irish Prime Minister's attempt to defuse tensions with United Kingdom by
proposing legislation to ease extradition of I.R.A. members who have escaped to Ireland, and describing
his demand that surrendered fugitives be treated fairly as quidpro quo for its passage). Professor Bassiouni
argues that a bilateral U.S. extradition treaty reflects the overall status of diplomatic relations between the
U.S. and its treaty partner. Thus, he points out, the U.S. government does not extradite to or seek
extradition from nations with which it has severed diplomatic relations. BASSIOuIi, supra note 6, at 41.
273. Judicial denial of an extradition petition rarely so offends a foreign state as to poison diplomacy
with that state. For example, after the United Kingdom refused to extradite Soering without assurances
following the European Court's judgment, there was no reported souring in relations with the United States.
The proposed system might in fact defuse diplomatic tensions by allowing the government to deflect
responsibility for individual extradition denials onto the judiciary. See infra notes 292-293 and
accompanying text.
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foreign policy. Courts interpret treaties,74 and it is the essential judicial
function to protect an individual's human rights. 275 Determining the
respective roles of the government and the judiciary requires a test that goes
beyond labels such as "foreign affairs" or "deprivation of liberty:"'276 the
separation of powers debate contained in political offense exception cases
provides such a test.
United States courts have held that the determination of whether a
particular offense is "political" is justiciable under the U.S. Constitution. 2'
These rulings reject the notion that the mere involvement of foreign states in
an issue grants the government a monopoly in extradition decisionmaking.278
Courts invoke the political question doctrine in international cases following
their determination that no judicially manageable criteria can be developed to
resolve the dispute. However, courts are equipped to decide what constitutes
a political offense in the extradition context.279
Evidentiary and fact-finding obstacles complicate the investigation of the
motives of foreign officials not subject to subpoena. These obstacles render
judicially unmanageable, and thus non-justiciable, the determination whether
an extradition request for a crime is genuine or a politically motivated
subterfuge."' This set of evidentiary and informational concerns separating
the justiciable from the non-justiciable is the crucial element of the political
question doctrine in the extradition context, and the key to sharing power
between the government and the judiciary.
Courts must be allowed to undertake any extradition-related inquiry that
will yield judicially accessible and admissible evidence. Courts of the requested
274. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) ("A court can construe a treaty and may
find it provides the answer.'); Bain, 641 F.2d at 514 ("It is clear that courts have authority to construe
treaties.").
275. See supra notes 259-268 and accompanying text (discussing normative bases for proposal).
276. See supra notes 35-61 and accompanying text (discussing traditionaIjudicial deference standards).
277. See, e.g., Bain, 641 F.2d at 513-15; In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 133-37 (2d Cir. 1981).
278. "[Als the Supreme Court has said, 'it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial competence.'" Bain, 641 F.2d at 514 (quoting Baker, 369
U.S. at 211).
279. E.g., Eain, 641 F.2d at 514-15 ("The existence of a violent political disturbance is an issue of
past fact: either there was demonstrable, violent activity tied to political causes or there was not. The
resources to make that initial determination can ordinarily be sufficiently produced for judicial
consideration.') (footnote omitted).
280. See, e.g., Mackin, 668 F.2d at 133 ("[There is] no inconsistency between confiding to the courts
a decision with respect to past facts and refusing to allow them to probe the motives of a requesting
government."); Eain, 641 F.2d at 513; In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'dper curtain sub
nora. Lincoln v. Powers, 241 U.S. 651 (1916).
This argument did not hinder the drafters of The Extradition Act of 1984, H.R. 3347, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1984). That bill, the most "judicial" of the extradition reform measures introduced during the
early 1980s, would have allowed judges to inquire whether the requesting nation was actually seeking
extradition on the basis of the fugitive's race, religion, sex, nationality, political opinion, or membership
in a social group. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. See also H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. at 5-6 (1984).
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state cannot compel testimony of witnesses residing in the requesting state to
determine that state's motive for extradition. However, the distinction between
general evidence and testimony concerning motive does not bar judicial inquiry
into legal procedures and penal treatment in foreign nations. Despite claims
to the contrary, 1 courts can effectively obtain and assess information about
the legal systems of other states and are thus well equipped to analyze the
human rights issues raised by extradition requests. Much of this information
is freely available, particularly that which is part of the requesting state's
written laws.282 Moreover, modem technology enables the increasing
dissemination of information about foreign states,283 and many government
and private agencies specialize in collecting and presenting human rights
data.2M
Courts therefore should not automatically treat extradition requests as non-
justiciable political questions. Lack of information does not impede
immigration judges presiding over political asylum and deportation cases from
hearing evidence on conditions in foreign countries. 2' These administrative
judges are agents of the head of state in the United States, but the resources
at their command differ little from the fact-finding devices available to the
judiciary: they regularly hear evidence, including affidavits, testimony, and
reports from the government.286 If immigration judges are permitted to
281. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
282. Those sections of the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act of 1978 that permit severe
restrictions of civil liberties, such as warrantless searches and arrests by police, the denial of right to trial
by jury in certain classes of cases, and use of moderate physical maltreatment to induce a statement, would
be clearly discernable by a foreign court. See Talcott, supra note 243, at 491 n.114.
283. Judge Weinstein pored over extensive documentation from a variety of sources and heard
testimony from several witnesses on both sides of the issue when investigating Israel's treatment of
Palestinian prisoners. He may not have had all the facts, but he certainly had enough of them to review
an extradition petition aggressively. See supra text accompanying note 204.
284. Groups like Amnesty International and Middle East Watch collect and disseminate human rights
data. Further, in 1961 the U.S. State Department began annually assessing the human rights records of
foreign nations, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1976 formalized this process by requiring the Department
to prepare reports on human rights violations. See 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (1988).
285. Kester, supra note 43, at 1481.
286. If an immigration judge denies political asylum or refuses to withhold deportation, the individual
may appeal to federal court. While the federal court does not undertake a de novo review of the factual
findings, it does scrutinize legal conclusions, a process which often entails detailed consideration of the
conditions in a foreign country. Cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1987) (discussing
circuit court's review of standard applied by immigration judge in asylum hearing); McMullen v. INS, 788
F.2d 591, 599-600 (9th Cir. 1986) (evaluating nature of Provisional Irish Republican Army in deciding
whether to grant asylum to member); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1984)
(reversing INS denial of political asylum on evidence that petitioner was threatened by rebels in requesting
country); McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing standard of review applied
by circuit court).
Some commentators have posited an even closer connection between extradition and political asylum
and deportation cases. Two commentators recently argued that the European Court's refusal to extradite
in Soering when the fugitive faced "a real risk" of ill treatmentreflected the Cardoza-Fonesca "well-founded
fear of persecution" standard used by U.S. courts in political asylum cases. John Quigley & S. Adele
Shank, Death Row as a Violation of Human Rights. Is it Illegal to Fxtradite to Virginia?, 30 VA. J. INT'L
L. 241,255 (1989). Even if the European Court was not consciously borrowing from political asylum law,
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determine whether an individual's fear of persecution in his native state is well-
founded, members .of the judiciary hearing extradition cases should not be
barred from deciding whether a fugitive faces a real risk of ill treatment in the
requesting state.
4. The Safe-Haven Problem
An extradition regime that protects a fugitive's human rights must also
provide a means to bring the fugitive to justice. Human rights considerations
cannot defeat the essential purpose of extradition: preventing fugitives from
using escape to avoid trial and punishment. This raises the safe-haven problem:
the prospect that a requested state's denial of extradition will attract fleeing
criminals." 7 Faced with this problem, some supporters of Soering-style
jurisprudence suggest inserting a clause into all extradition treaties to allow
the requested state, if it refuses to extradite, to try the fugitive on its own
soil.2"' However, the proposal advanced in this article would solve the safe-
haven problem less obtrusively: once assurances are received, the fugitive is
extradited to face trial and punishment.289 A requested state that regularly
extradites after receiving assurances, unlike a nation that simply denies
extradition, will not attract fugitive felons.
5. Assurances and Judicial Activism
The assurances proposal invites less judicial activism than compromise
solutions that propose instituting a humanitarian exception to extradition,
the standards for evaluating the risk of ill treatment are undeniably close.
287. The Canadian Supreme Court in the Kindler and Ng cases took this possibility very seriously.
In dismissing the challenges to the extradition orders, both plurality opinions cited as a primary concern
the risk that felons from the United States would cross the long, undefended border into Canada. Kindler
v. Canada, No. 21,321, slip op. at 9 (Can. Sept. 26, 1991) (LaForest, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 21
(McLachlin, J.) (plurality opinion).
288. Breitenmoser & Wilms, supra note 4, at 881-82; see also 60 INSTrruTm OF INT'L L., INST. OF
INT'L L. Y.B., pt. II, at 216 (1983). Several European states have achieved this result by adopting
legislation that allows their courts to try fugitives. See Robertson, supra note 5, at 231. This solution would
be unworkable in nations like the United Kingdom and the United States, where individuals charged with
crimes are entitled to confront their accusers. One commentator has noted this is particularly problematic
in the United Kingdom:
The UK would have difficulty in [adopting such a rule], and even in trying British subjects for
murders committed abroad, owing to the restrictive nature of [the British] system of criminal
justice and evidence. Continental courts frequently receive evidence even on vital and contested
matters by written statement but UK courts do not.
Id. at 231.
289. As Justice Sopinka's dissent to Kindler and Ng noted, the Canadian Supreme Court's concern
over creation of a safe haven ignored Article 6 of the U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty, which would have
allowed Canada to extradite Kindler and Ng with assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed
or carried out. See Kindler, slip op. at 5 (Sopinka, J., dissenting); see also supra note 186.
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allowing courts to deny requests in egregious cases. 2 0 Requiring the
requesting state to provide assurances against mistreatment is less drastic than
dismissing the extradition request entirely. A court should not take the ultimate
measure of dismissing the extradition request until it has exhausted all other
avenues along which the extradition might proceed. 291
Moreover, the government of the requested state may itself welcome an
expanded judicial role in this area. There may be less embarrassment to the
requested state's foreign relations if the judiciary, rather than the government,
investigates the requesting state's penal procedures.292 The requesting state
is less likely to treat the denial (or demand for assurances) as a diplomatic snub
if it issues from an (arguably) impartial judiciary rather than the political
branch responsible for conducting foreign policy.293
VII. CONCLUSION
The Soering decision highlights the inadequacies of current extradition law
in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Soering cast doubt on
the legal and factual assumptions underlying the rule of non-inquiry and the
restricted judicial role in extradition. In so doing, it invites debate over the
continued vitality of the rationales supporting the traditional extradition regime,
including the arguments that extradition is a foreign policy matter, that the
government can adequately protect human rights, and that the judiciary lacks
access to information regarding human rights abuses in foreign states. Several
judges in the United States and Canada have embraced the union of human
rights and extradition law articulated in Soering, although their efforts have
not yet succeeded in displacing the traditional principles.
This article's proposal for a new extradition regime provides for a more
active judicial role in the assessment of human rights while preserving the
essential function of extradition. The proposed solution would protect human
rights more effectively than the current regime. Ultimately, any extradition
model that bars judicial inquiry into the procedures and penal practices of the
290. See generally Anderson, supra note 33, at 163 (allowing judicial invocation of "humanitarian
exception" to bar extradition in "egregious cases"); Hughes, supra note 29, at 322 (limiting judicial refusals
to extradite to "instances of particularly abusive proceedings which shock the conscience").
291. This proposal also has the advantage of better promoting international comity. By requiring
assurances, a court signals that it is willing to respect the requesting state's legal system if that state
promises to treat the fugitive fairly. This slights the requesting state's legal system less than a judicial
declaration that the fugitive cannot receive fair treatment. The demand for assurances may also provide
the requesting state an opportunity to show that it respects the rights of accused criminals.
292. See Kester, supra note 43, at 1481-82; Lubet, supra note 18, at 285; see also supra note 270.
293. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513 (7th Cir. 1981) (congressional decision to allow courts
to make political offense determination permits President to avoid political and economic retaliation for
denials of extradition); SHEARER, supra note 7, at 192; Lubet & Czaczkes, supra note 270, at 200; Note,
Bringing the Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law Approach, 11 CORNELL J. INT'L L. 71, 74 (1978).
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requesting state fails to provide redress for meritorious claims of threatened
violations. Judges cannot blind themselves to the consequences of the exercise
of extradition; as Judge Weinstein noted, "[in] instances where immediate
political, military or economic needs of the United States induce the State
Department to ignore the rights of the accused.., the courts must be prepared
to act."2 4
294. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 415 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted), aff'd on other
grounds, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
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